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ABSTRACT 
On July 1,1996, the federal government introduced Biii-C12, the new Employment 
Insurance (EI) legislation claiming that one purpose is to extend coverage to those who were 
excluded from U/. This includes the labour force in non-standard forms of employment (those 
in part-time, temporary, seasonal and 'just-in-time' employment also referred to as the 
precariously employed).This project concludes that contrary to this proclamation, the newEl 
legislation is designed to exclude from benefits the very labour force the government 
contended to extend the coverage to. The El guidelines defeat the very purpose of extension 
of coverage to th is workforce by imposing strict eligibility criteria and increased entry 
requirements. It increases the qualifying period by 233% from what it was under Ul and it 
introduces a penalty for repeat-use of the program. The new fixed averaging formula used to 
determine the level of benefits as well as weeks of benefits and the new-re-entrant 
requirement of 910 hours end up either excluding many of the precariously employed from 
benefits or reducing their benefit levels and benefit weeks. 
The precariously employed are at a disadvantage relative to the full-year-full-time 
employed workers while employed. As a result of their position in the labour market, they lose 
or receive benefits at a reduced level ; they receive lower hourly rates of pay, work on average 
less hours and have less job security. They are also exposed to frequent unemployment 
spells. The disadvantage these workers face during employment puts them at a further 
disadvantage in the event of unemployment because of the reform of the program that uses 
hours of work (35 hour- week) to establish eligibility and entitlement to benefits as well as to 
determine the duration of benefits. Not only will the majority of the precariously employed have 
difficulties qualifying for benefits, but the new El program also excludes or disqualifies some 
part-time workers who were eligible under the old program. 
The government blamed workers' reliance on Ul as a 'bad form of dependence' and 
portrayed others as suffering from a 'lack of work effort'; and yet others as having 'minor 
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workforce attachment' . It is argued in this study that these labels portray the unemployed as 
'undeserving' and thereby justify their exclusion from benefits and/or the reduction of their 
levels of employment insurance. The full-time-full-year workers who are portrayed as having 
'major workforce attachment' are also affected by some changes in the legislation. 
Arguing from a Structural Marxist point of view, this study concludes that the main 
purpose of the reform is to weaken the safety net for the jobless and thereby increase the 
vulnerability of the working class in general to the hazards of the market place at a time when 
unemployment is high. The relative accessibility of the old program, with its income 
replacement of 55% of insured earnings and the duration of benefits, was believed to loosen 
the cash/work nexus by way of de-commodifying labour power. The reform, therefore, is 
designed to rid the program of these perceived or actual effects and to strengthen the actuarial 
principle. As a result , the new El program curtails benefits and entitlements for workers; it 
forces the working class back into the wage-capital labour relations as soon as possible. It 
does this by diminishing the capacity of the program to immunize the working class from the 
forces of the market. This endeavor is consistent with the view of structural Marxism; this 
perspective postulates that state institutions and policies in capitalist societies operate to fulfill 
the general maintenance and reproduction of the fundamental relations of production in the 
work place and the relations of exchange and distribution of commodities, namely private 
property and market. 
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Introduction: 
The major purpose of this project is to examine the impact of Bill C-12 , the new 
Employment Insurance (EI) legislation on the labour force employed in non-standard forms of 
employment (part-timers, temporary workers as well as seasonal workers) . Particular attention 
will be paid to the curtailment of Ul benefits and entitlements. 
To address this, the analysis will focus on the extent to which and how the following 
changes on the legislation will affect the income replacement of the labour force employed in 
the non-standard forms of employment: 
- program eligibility: entitlement and duration of regular benefits based on 
hours worked rather than weeks; the entrance requirements for part-time 
workers and new/re-entrants; 
- the "extension" of coverage to all part-timers; 
- changes in benefit calculations; 
- reduction in maximum length of benefits; 
- reduction or elimination of regular benefits depending on the regularity of 
claims (the 'Intensity rule" and benefit Clawback); 
- reduction of the Maximum Insurable Earnings (MIE); 
- premiums payable on all earnings up to the lowered MIE threshold; 
- the introduction of Family Income Support (FIS) based on family incomes 
and individual Ul contributions. 
The focus of this analysis is on the income benefit side of the program as this study is 
concerned with eligibility for income support for the unemployed. It excludes employment 
benefits that are designed to increase the skills and employability of the unemployed workers. 
Organization of the Paper: 
The paper is organized into three sections. The first section reviews the history and 
evolution of unemployment insurance in Canada. The arguments and debates for and 
against the social responsibility for the unemployed, the eventual recognition of some form of 
protection for the unemployed from the hazards of the market economy and the principles 
behind the support for or objection to the program are reviewed in this section. The discussion 
pertaining to the argument for and against the program are believed to shed some light on the 
functions of the program as perceived by the state and capital. 
Section two focuses on the new legislation, Bill C-12. This section examines the 
ideological issues behind changes in the program. The assumptions and justifications made by 
the government in regards to the need for change, and the neo-conservative views embedded 
within these assumptions are examined in this section of the paper. As one of the reasons 
given by the government for the introduction of Employment Insurance is to respond to the 
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'inflexibility' of the labour market, this section also explores the labour market by way of 
identifying the groups most affected by this change- those in non-standard forms of 
employment. 
Section three will focus on the changes introduced with Bill C-12 and the impact of this 
Bill on the workforce in non-standard forms of employment. As the federal government has 
given reasons for introducing certain reforms in specific areas of the program, this section will 
include an examination of the reasons given in addition to the analysis of the impact of each 
key area on the working class. The following questions will be addressed in this section: What 
are the changes introduced? What reasons were given for introducing specific changes? What 
is the overarching objective of these changes? How do these changes affect the workers in 
the non-standard forms of employment? and; Which class of workers are affected the most by 
which changes in the program? 
Relevance to Social Work 
It is widely known that social work as a profession is confronted daily by the human 
misery that emanates from unemployment, economic deprivation and related poverty. Riches 
and Ternowetsky (1990) note that because of its unique position , social work " ... has an 
unavoidable date with unemployment. Indeed, what social workers ... daily confront in their 
practice are the human consequences and social costs of an economy that is being 
restructured and reshaped" (p. 14). 
Unemployment and the correlate of poverty are characterized by hopelessness, 
helplessness, powerlessness, depression, low self-esteem, worthlessness and self-blame. 
Kirsh (1992) reminds us that "[i]t is (also) widely acknowledged that conditions of poverty 
create physical risks , and to the extent that poverty and unemployment are strongly related , 
unemployment is a health hazard" (p.56). Moreover, and as noted by the same author, the 
"evidence suggests that increases in the rate of unemployment are accompanied by 
increases in the rates of spousal abuse, divorce, sexual assault, child abuse, children 's 
problems in school, criminal acts, and racial tensions" (p. 52) (emphasis added) . 
Individuals experiencing these problems constitute the majority of the service population of 
social work. However, social work interventions, especially those related to unemployment 
counseling, as noble and necessary efforts as they are , are destined to ultimately fail if they 
are not adjunct to social welfare policies as well as political and economic initiatives (Kirsh , 
1992; McKay, 1990).This implies that social workers should go beyond the provision of 
individual psychological/emotional support or services and be, as Riches and Ternowetsky 
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(1990) note, "among the first to subject a society' s economic and welfare policies to careful 
scrutiny, observe human consequences and social costs, and make proposals for change (p. 
18). 
Accordingly, this project endeavours to scrutinize the restructuring of (Un)Employment 
Insurance and its implications on those marginalized by the labour market, namely, those in 
the non-standard forms of employment. It is hoped that this analysis will inform social work 
intervention with the unemployed and/or the economically deprived. 
Analytical Framework 
The overall approach taken to examine the implications of the reform on workers in 
non-standard forms of employment is that of 'structural Marxism'. The main goal of institutional 
and policy analyses informed by this approach is to analyze how the effects of state 
institutions and policies operate to fulfill the general maintenance, protection and reproduction 
of the fundamental relations of production between people in the work place and the relations 
of exchange and distribution of commodities (Barrow, 1993, Gough, 1979;0ffe, 1984;Gonick, 
1987). 
This structural Marxist view postulates that social institutions fulfill specific functions 
necessary to maintain or sustain a particular mode of production. For example the economic 
structure of a capitalist system such as that of Canada is constituted primarily by relationships 
that organize the production, exchange and distribution of commodities, namely, private 
property and the market. The most important institutions within this economic structure are the 
relations of production between people in the work place and the relations of exchange and 
distribution of commodities in the market place. The central aspect of this economic institution 
is that goods, services, minerals and land must be available only as commodities. The 
propertyless can acquire the goods and services they need by selling the only commodity they 
own, their labour power, to those who own and control productive assets (Pixley, 1993). 
In a capitalist system, labour power is considered as a commodity which is utilized to 
produce other commodities. It is, as Wright (1979) puts it, "the productive capacity sold in 
labour market for use in the production of other commodities" (p. 114). Accordingly , the labour 
market, an arena where the buyers and sellers of labour power meet, constitutes the most 
significant feature of a capitalist system. Any state intervention that may have a de-
commodification effect of labour power or other goods and services is, therefore, perceived as 
undermining the market mechanism or the relations of exchange and distribution of 
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commodities. Social wages or the provision of cash transfers, social services, and 
unemployment benefits, imply a de-commodification of labour power. Those who control the 
productive assets view the social provision of these services, including Unemployment 
Insurance, as a threat to labour market mechanisms as it interferes with the availability of 
labour power as a commodity (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Pixley, 1993). It is this threat, whether 
perceived or actual that the government is trying to address through the new El legislation. 
Structuralists view the welfare state as 'capitalist' to the extent that it creates, 
maintains and restores the conditions required for capital accumulation (Poulantzas, 1978). 
The methodological criterion for conceptualizing what makes the state 'capitalist', despite some 
of its activities on behalf of the working class, is to specify ways in which the state is 
functionally related to and dependent upon the accumulation process (Barrow, 1993). This 
perspective does not assume the state is benevolent. Neither does it view the state as a 
neutral arbiter between competing groups or classes. The structuralist thesis is that the 
functions of a state in any given mode of production are to protect , reproduce, maintain or 
sustain the fundamental relations of production upon which the economic system is based. As 
noted above, capitalist production relations are primarily organized around private ownership 
of productive forces and the market place. State policies and state institutions are, therefore, 
best understood within structural Marxism according to the role they play in maintaining this 
system of relations. 
Because the state does not command economic performance or have direct control 
over the means of production, it relies on those who have control over these phenomena for 
economic growth and the creation of employment. Actual decisions about investment, job 
creation and wages are dependent upon the decision of capitalists to invest. However, they do 
not invest unless they are convinced that there is reasonable guarantee for profit. This in turn 
implies that the state has to create fertile grounds or incentives for investment. Where state 
policies do not create such fertile grounds, capital withholds investment, disinvests or moves 
capital toward more favourable economies and societies. The implication here is that the state 
necessarily serves the interests of those who have control over the accumulation process for 
its own fiscal functioning and ultimately its own legitimacy. Its powers are limited by this 
dependency, and as a result its functions are ultimately oriented towards creating favourable 
conditions. Within this framework, state intervention, including those designed to 
accommodate workers' demands, are less likely to contradict or negate the functional 
requirements of the fundamental relations of production in the final analysis. 
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Gough (1997) notes that the state contradicts the basic and direct requirements of the 
economic system in its drive to accommodate workers' demands, for example for adequate 
social wage. The latter which is part of the legitimation function (O'Connor, 1973) of the state, 
is a response or concessions designed to ameliorate class strife and restlessness. The 
legitimation function, according to the structural perspective, is necessitated by the fact that 
the state must try to win the loyalty of the propertyless classes who are economically deprived 
and exploited by the capitalist accumulation process. Some policies such as education, health, 
unemployment insurance and public housing are necessary not only for ensuring loyalty of the 
propertyless to the system, but they are also necessary for the reproduction and maintenance 
of free labour power. 
However, herein lies the dilemma of the state in that the provision of these services, 
including that of unemployment insurance, as noted earlier, weaken capital-wage-labour 
relations. As Pixley (1993) notes," ... unemployment benefits do indeed de-commodify labour 
power or weaken the cash/work nexus (since the human attached to the labour power can 
survive without selling it to the lowest bidder)" (p. 20) .The state, therefore, in its efforts to 
preserve the accumulation process must protect it from legitimation strategies and their de-
commodifying effects. This is done by increasingly incorporating labour power into the capital-
wage labour relation. It is within this context that unemployment insurance, which was 
established as a legitimating strategy in response to class based opposition, currently finds 
itself. 
As noted earlier, the survival of workers in a capitalist system is primarily dependent 
upon the sale of their labour power; their welfare is contingent upon the cash/work nexus as 
dictated by the labour market economy. However, as Pixley (1993) and Esping-Andersen 
(1990) observe, Ul enables them, albeit temporarily, to maintain a livelihood without reliance 
on the market, especially if the program is accessed with ease and levels of income 
replacement are adequate, thereby de-commodifying labour power. It is this effect of the 
program ( i.e. its unhinging of labour power from the market) that the government has 
addressed through the introduction of El. This reform screens out or rejects provisions of the 
old system which were viewed as incompatible with the conditions required for capital 
accumulation or labour market participation . The reduction of benefit levels and benefit weeks 
are designed to drive recipients or beneficiaries back to work as soon as possible. Failing this, 
there is always the means-or-income- tested benefits whose mainspring is the 'poor law' and 
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which builds entitlements, as Esping-Andersen (1990) notes, "around demonstrable and abject 
needs" (p.22). 
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Section One 
Unemployment Insurance-Its Evolution and Functions: An Historical Overview 
The first attempt for national unemployment insurance as a legitimation function to calm 
the class based opposition to unemployment in Canada was the ill-fated attempt by R.B 
Bennett (Bennett New Deal) in 1935. Canada had, by this time, experienced pre- and post-
First World War mass unemployment, the gradual displacement of labour by technology and 
the sudden economic crisis of the Great Depression. These social phenomena brought about 
demands by unemployed workers and trade unionists for the socialization of responsibilities for 
those out of work and the aged. It also forced a debate among politicians and capitalists on 
the question of social insurance as a means of preventing the militancy of the unemployed and 
the threat of revolt and/or industrial unrest (Finkel, 1977; Cuneo, 1980). It was in response to 
such militancy by unemployed workers supported by trade unionists that Sir Charles Gordon 
(President of Canada's leading bank in the 30's , the Bank of Montreal) urged unemployment 
insurance program on Bennett's government; he wrote, "[M]ay I suggest to you that for our 
general self-preservation some such arrangements will have to be worked out in Canada and 
that if it can be done soon so much the better'' (cited by Finkel,1977:351). Benett who agreed 
with this view wrote later that 
"A good deal of pruning is sometimes necessary to save a tree and it would be 
well for us in Canada to remember that there is considerable pruning to be 
done if we are to preserve the fabric of the capitalist system (Finkel, 
1977:351) ." 
Of equal importance to the preservation of the capitalist system and pertinent to capital 
accumulation was the maintenance of an industrial reserve army. The sustenance of 
purchasing power at a time of unemployment was also believed to mitigate further depression, 
while the contributory nature of the program was seen as forced savings by workers for the 
time of unemployment (Finkel, 1977; Cuneo, 1980). In addition to these is the recognition that 
unemployment was, as Jacob Cohen (cited by Cuneo, 1980) noted in the thirties, peculiarly 
'organic' and not an accidental or temporary anomaly in a capitalist society. 
The dynamics of capitalism which involved the purchase of labour power for profit 
maximization, the introduction of technology as a labour saving mechanism, the subsequent 
and inevitable temporary and permanent unemployment and the expansion of the reserve 
army of labour, finally brought about the recognition , albeit a reluctant one, for collective 
responsibility for the unemployed and the subsequent introduction of 'the Bennett New Deal' in 
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parliament in 1935. However, the 'Bennett New Deal' did not materialize due to jurisdictional 
conflict with the provinces and was declared ultra vires by the Supreme Court of Canada. 
The first successful unemployment insurance leg islation was introduced by Mackenzie 
King shortly following a constitutional amendment in 1941 . Experience with massive 
unemployment , the Great Depression and widespread human suffering were not sufficient to 
convince capital and the state to introduce a safety net mechanism in the 30' s. As noted by 
Struthers (1983), the " war, not the depression, finally convinced King that unemployment 
insurance was an urgent necessity" (p 202). This sense of urgency was blatantly expressed by 
a member of parliament, Mr. Neill , in 1941. In his criticism of the opposition to the program by 
the Canadian Manufacturer's Association and the Chamber of Commerce, he said 
... cheap, short sighted, ostrich-headed! Do they want a bloody revolution after 
the war? Think of all those idle men who will come back. They will not stand for 
situations that prevailed last time (cited by Cuneo, 1980: 132). 
The 'last time' was the massive unemployment and the subsequent unrest after First 
World War where the reserve army of labour swelled due to demobilization of soldiers and 
those released from the munition factories. 
Unemployment Insurance Act, was, therefore , proclaimed in 1941 with a design not to 
redistribute income but to preserve the fabrics of capitalism and enforce work ethic. Guest 
(1980) notes that it was "generally held by those who formulated the plan that benefit 
schedules must be held well below the wage earner's normal take-home pay to maintain 
incentives to rejoin the labour force at the first opportunity" ( P 1 08) . 
The 1941 legislation which was based on insurance/contributory principles established 
seven categories of wage earners according to which benefits were graded. The Labour 
Department at the time, as quoted by Struthers (1983) contended that 
[t]he best that unemployment insurance can be expected to do ... is to relate 
benefits (and contributions) to actual earnings and therefore to the standard of 
living while employed' (p 201) . 
Accordingly, benefits increased as per the location of a worker within the seven categories. 
This grading system had far reaching effects on the working class . As Cuneo writes 
First, the state' s contributory principle enforced poverty on the lower .. . working 
class ... not only did workers contribute directly in subsidizing unemployment 
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caused structurally by the forces of capitalism, but indirectly as well through 
increased taxation and consumer prices. Second, the .. . Act reproduced the 
internal income stratification within the working class (by tying benefits to 
past contributions and wages) .. . Third, the structure of benefits regulated the 
flow of labour. Because workers received fewer benefits than ... past 
wages .. . they were forced through the experience of deprivation back into the 
employed labour force .. . Fourth , the income structure of the Act divided the 
working class politically against itself. (P. 138) (emphasis added) . 
The Act excluded important segments of the labour force and required insured workers 
to demonstrate that they were involuntarily unemployed and that they were capable of and 
available for employment in order to be eligible for benefits. Eligibility for benefits were 
dependent on the level of workforce attachment. Social insurance, according to these 
characteristics, was designed to reflect the market place and not to change its workings 
(Struthers, 1983; Cuneo, 1980). 
It should be noted here that capital objected to the program for it (the program) had a 
de-commodifying effect of labour power. Among submissions opposing the enactment of the 
1941 unemployment insurance were all three sectors of capital , financial , commercial and 
industrial that were represented respectively by the Canadian Bankers Association of Canada, 
Canadian Life Insurance Officers Association , Canadian Chamber of Commerce, Canadian 
Transit Association and Canadian Manufacturers Association (Cuneo, 1980). As noted earlier, 
capitalists urged for unemployment insurance under the pressures of massive unemployment 
and the depression. However, as Michal Kalecki ( cited by Finkel , 1977) argued in 1943, 
capital which saw state intervention as a contradictory blessing was still largely opposed to Ul 
in general and to other measures which subsidized consumption in particular. Kalecki ' s 
observation at the time was that even though mass pressures and the need to curb workers 
militancy shifted their position and views, they would soon once again oppose Ul. 
Unemployment Insurance -1971 
The program grew in depth and width with the advent of Keynesianism and 
unprecedented economic growth between 1940 and 1970. However, the most notable 
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revision of the Act came about in 1971.The solution to massive unemployment proposed by 
Keynesianism gave governments in capitalist societies a greater role in the economic 
management and the provision of social security measures during these years (Pal , 1988; 
McBride,1992; Phillips, 1986). The major implication of the liberalization of the program in 1971 
was that the state started to see unemployment insurance more within a social as opposed to 
an economic context (MacBride, 1992). The 1970 White Paper, Unemployment Insurance in 
the 70's, as noted by Pal (1988) 
explicitly identified Ul as a social policy and described the Ul Act as providing 
financial assistance to lower income workers during periods of temporary 
unemployment. .. [T]he White Paper maintained that modern social policy had to 
go beyond simple monetary assistance to 'being directed toward the more 
complete fulfillment of people' (p. 75) . 
The Act placed less emphasis on worker's attachment to labour force in determining 
accessibility and entitlement to benefits. Only eight weeks of workforce attachment in a 104 
week period was required for eligibility for benefits under this Act. The level of benefits 
provided by this Act was considerably more generous than those provided by its predecessor; 
benefits were higher, near universality was introduced, sickness and pregnancy coverages 
were offered, and a regional calculation/eligibility formula was introduced (Phillips, 1986; Pal , 
1988). When universal coverage commenced in 1972, the Act covered 96% of the labour 
force. Excluded were the self-employed, persons aged 70 years and older, and individuals 
earning less than one-fifth of the maximum weekly insurable earnings. Eligibility for sickness 
and maternity benefits required at least 20 weeks of insurable employment. The introduction 
of sickness and maternity leaves as well as the inclusion of dependants in the compensation 
(75% of insurable earnings for those with dependents) made the scheme more than just pure 
insurance. The 1971 Act, as McBride (1992) citing other studies notes, 
was a unique unemployment insurance programme that combined objectives 
from three different policy areas ... labour market and man power policy , social 
welfare policy and insurance principles twisted ... into a more efficient and 
socially useful package of unemployment insurance" (p 164). 
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As Table 1 (taken from Pal, 1988:78) shows, there were objections to this legislation by 
employers. They rejected the minimum qualifying period of eight weeks of employment as 
insufficient workforce attachment. They also objected to sickness and maternity benefits 
because they perceived them to be contrary to the insurance principles and the prerequisites 
(capability and availability to work) of the program. 
Amendments since mid-1970s have seen the reversal of the trend between 1940 and 
1971 (McBride, 1992; Pulkingham, 1996). Changes in the 1970s and the 1980s aimed at 
reducing benefits, discouraging workers from voluntarily leaving (quitting) their jobs or from 
being dismissed from their jobs because of misconduct. The focus was on strengthening the 
link between Ul and the needs of the market. Various bills passed during the mid and latter 
half of the 1970s were geared towards the reduction of benefits, increasing the qualifying 
periods and strengthening the 'active' as opposed to the 'passive' (the supportive or 
compensatory) aspects of the program. High income earners were to pay back 30% of all Ul 
benefits through taxes. As the benefit rates were perceived to be too generous they were 
reduced from time to time. 
The 1980s saw the intensification of the pressure on Ul by making benefits harder to 
get and to keep (McBride, 1992); this pressure culminated in the privatization of the program 
through the introduction of Bill C-21 in 1989-90. This Bill brought about the end of social 
responsibility for the unemployed by withdrawing government contributions to the fund initially 
introduced over 50 years ago. The privatization of the program which made the fund solely 
dependent on employees and employers was, as Overtone (1995) notes, "a dramatic move 
away from the original principle ... (p.5) . Not only has Bill C-21 set the stage for further 
unraveling of the program but it also went further by shifting resources away from 'passive' 
income support policies to 'active' labour market policies (work-fare, work sharing , job-
creation, training and developmental assistance). About $2.21 billion in Ul funds were 
approved for 'active' adjustment assistance despite the failures of previous training 
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programs to reduce the unemployment rate (Lazars, 1994). The Technical and Vocational 
Training Assistance Act which had been in place for over thirty years, and the tens of bill ions of 
dollars spent by both levels of government on various types of training programs, as Lazars 
(1994) indicates, have not reduced the unemployment rate. As a matter of fact it is was in the 
last three decades that unemployment moved upwards (see Appendix 1 ). It has also been 
established by studies (Corak, 1993) that past training tied to 'active' unemployment insurance 
participation did not affect repeat Ul participation by those targeted . The main purpose of such 
measures, as Pulkingham (1998) observes is to 
incorporate more stringent mechanisms to ensure that recipients are required to 
look for and find employment and penalties if they fail to do so. These include 
measures such as work-fare/learn-fare, reducing benefit levels, requiring 
claimants to pick up cheques in person and/or report ... in person or more 
frequent attend job-training courses, job preparation sessions ... (forthcoming). 
Since the experience of thirty years of training and retraining did not have the effect of 
reducing unemployment or repeat participation in the program by the unemployed, active 
measures as those mentioned above could only be designed to curtail entitlements and 
benefits and subsequently the number of the beneficiaries. The new legislation ( Bill C-12) 
takes this approach further by introducing sweeping changes designed to increase "work-
incentives". 
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Section Two 
Bill C-12, The Employment Insurance Act: 
The Principles or Motive Forces Behind the Change 
On July 1,1996, Bill C-12, the new Employment Insurance Act came into effect 
replacing the Unemployment Insurance Act and the National Training Act. Although the 
new legislation, like its predecessor, provides individual, regular benefits and special 
(maternity, parental/adoption) benefits as well as employment assistance ("active re-
employment benefits"), it has been substantially restructured . In addition , this legislation 
continues the incremental erosion of income replacement that followed the 1971 liberalization 
of the program. 
The character of change or reform can be identified by what social issues and 
problems have been addressed or resolved and what kind of social issues or programs have 
been established in their place. The principles or motive forces which guided these changes 
can also be identified by looking at the changes themselves and the reasons and justifications 
given to legitimize and/or bring about the changes to Ul. The discussion in this section of the 
paper will focus on the justifications and reasons first. Since among the government's reasons 
for the introduction of the reform are to extend coverage to those who were excluded from 
the Ul program (those in non-standard forms of employment) and to promote flexible work 
arrangement (HRDC, 1994), this section will also examine the labour market as it pertains to 
those employed in non-standard forms of employment. 
The current economic and social policies prevailing in Canada are congruent with 
those of the neo-conservative social and economic philosophy. These are informed by the 
classical doctrines of individualism and Adam Smith's laissez-faire economic theory that 
involves monetarism and the free play of market forces (Mishra ,1981 ,1984; Johnson & et al, 
1994). Monetarism which has provided the policy platform for neo-conservatives in Canada in 
the last three decades (McBride, 1992) advocates for state withdrawal from the involvement 
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and/or intervention in the market economy in general and the labour market in particular. It 
holds the view that the market, with minimal or no regulation , is the best mechanism for the 
provision of human services. The government's role is seen as minimal and policy direction 
should focus on privatization , deregulation, 'user fees' , private insurance and inflation control 
(McBride, 1992; Warnock, 1986; Stanford, 1996). The latter, as the neo-conservatives argue, 
is partially caused by government overspending and uncontrolled money supply. Inflation, in 
turn causes social and economic problems part of which is unemployment. It is, therefore, held 
that if government reduces its intervention in the economy and restricts its activities to the 
control of inflation and the elimination of the deficit, the problems the welfare state face , 
including that of unemployment, would be resolved . What this implies is that the free market 
economy is superior to any other forms of economy. Vedder and Gallaway (1993) go as far as 
to argue that 
... historical experience tells us that.. .interventionism is doomed to failure ... ; 
throughout the twentieth century, the invisible hand of the unfettered market 
mechanism has consistently outperformed efforts of the highly visible hand of 
the state in providing economic stability" (p. 296). 
This perspective, which is the embodiment of the neo-conservative view, blames 
unemployment on the welfare state which is seen to impede the process of capital 
accumulation. It is argued that the average or "natural" unemployment rate has been climbing 
upwards in the last two to three decades due to governmental policies of labour market 
regulations, including those of minimum wages, unemployment insurance, the growth of trade 
union collective bargaining and social security at large (Vedder & Gallaway, 1993). In other 
wards, state intervention in labour and other markets through macroeconomic policies , the 
encouragement of collective bargaining , and social provision such as Ul which result in high 
taxation and social expenditures are seen as impediments to the functioning of the labour 
market, and, as driving unemployment above its "natural" levels. Tax provisions and market 
regulations are believed to constitute disincentive to investment or even barriers to job creation 
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(Macdonald , 1984). For example, Macdonald (1984) echoes the neo-conservative argument 
"that unemployment insurance provisions have contributed to unemployment over the last 12 
years, and minimum wage limits affect employment prospects" (p. 33). These two factors 
interfere with the profit margins because they are perceived as preventing capital from driving 
down its labour costs; they also are contrary to the neo-conservative view of social policy 
which should be designed to give the neediest in the society the basic essentials necessary to 
survive, while allowing maximum scope for markets to determine distribution of income, goods 
and services with minimum intervention from government. 
The argument pertaining to limiting effect of minimum wage to employment finds its 
roots in the early neoclassical interpretation of the labour market. For example, Pigou (cited in 
Pal, 1988) in 1933 analyzed unemployment as the problem caused by the supply side of the 
market. As it was suggested by Pigou, unemployment was not an inevitable outcome of the 
unfettered free market economy but "an oversupply of labour in terms of a given price. If 
labourers would lower their price they could reduce or erase their unemployment" (p.18). One 
way to alleviate the limiting effects of minimum wage and unemployment insurance, according 
to the neo-conservatives, is "deregulation in general, or in specific sectors' (Macdonald , 
1984:33). This will encourage greater investment by way of greater profitabil ity. The end result 
is more employment and improved performance of the market. 
Based on their belief that the market economy is a superior means of production, 
distribution and exchange of goods and services, the neo-conservatives object and/or reject 
any social policy, including that of unemployment, that has a de-commodifying effect. Goods, 
resources such as land and minerals, as well as services should be available only as 
commodities according to the neo-conservatives. Universal programs which pay benefits to all 
citizens who meet certain criteria or the provision of health and public education are not 
favoured by neo-conservatives as they violate market mechanisms. Their preference is to 
target or selectively provide assistance to those whose needs are not met through the market 
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mechanism. Social policy, according to the neo-conservatives, should restrict itself to means-
tested social assistance as a last resort for those who, due to personal or individual reasons 
cannot support themselves by selling their labour power. The means-or-income- tested social 
assistance which finds its roots in the poor-law tradition , as Esping-Andersen (1990) observes, 
" was conspicuously designed for purposes of stratification. By punishing and stigmatizing 
recipients, it promotes social dualism and has therefore been a chief target of labour-
movement attacks" (p. 24). The neo-conservative rejection of the welfare state in general is 
expressed in various ways as discussed below. 
Resnick (1994) observes that the neo-conservatives criticism of the welfare state had 
various levels to it: first, the welfare state is said to have a "'built-in tendencies' to deficit 
financing, welfare expenditures were 'destroying work ethic' , state spending was generally 'out 
of control', and government regulation was 'sapping the vitality of the market system'(p.26). 
Second is the assertion about 'government growth' as a result of excessive expectations and 
demands by citizens on governments, and, the electoral competition that encourages these 
demands. Included in their argument about government growth is their view about 'self 
serving' public sector employees whom they blame for the expansion of the welfare state or 
government growth. As noted by the same author, 
[c]entral government bureaucrats, social workers, and public housing officials, 
for example, (are seen) to be the real beneficiaries of an ever expanding state 
sector .. . whole sections of society had bought into the rhetoric of the welfare 
state, coming to believe in their entitlements to ever-greater benefits, regardless 
of social costs. Welfare recipient, tenants in public housing, single mothers, and 
members of racial minorities are some examples that the neo-conservatives 
... cite. To these had been joined groups of unionized workers both in public and 
private sectors, insistently pressing on the political-economic system their 
demands for more (p.26) . 
The third criticism of the welfare state by the neo-conservatives is that explained by 
Mishra (1981) .This pertains to their assertion of 'government failure' in its policies to alleviate 
poverty. Rather than the intended goals, government policies (social safety net) gave rise to 
unforseen consequences not only of the poor peoples' reluctance to engage in low-wage 
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labour and undermining their view that" in order to succeed ... the poor need most of all the 
spur of their poverty", but also of family disorganization in the ghettos in the United States 
(p.32). The expression of the above noted view in our era, according to Mishra, is a return to 
the " 'less eligibility' principle of 1834' " where the "apologist of free-enterprise capitalism 
proudly proclaims the necessity of poverty in a capitalist society, a necessity which the welfare 
system fails to appreciate"(p.34) . 
Neo-conservative Arguments Against Ul. 
Neo-conservatives, therefore, based on these assumptions, oppose state intervention 
in the economy in general and unemployment insurance benefits and minimum wage 
legislation in particular; Unemployment Insurance in particular is targeted as capital and its 
neo-conservative advocates perceive the program as an improvement of labour's bargaining 
powers vis-a-vis capital. This increased bargaining power may translate into higher wages, 
which in turn, according to this perspective, leads to less employment; the axiom is that the 
higher the wages, the fewer workers capital employs. Workers receiving unemployment 
compensation are protected to an extent from the hazards of free market and can afford to 
reject work and wage rates they might otherwise have been forced to take (McBride, 
1992).The president of the Canadian Federation of Independent Business (cited in ECEJ , 
1993) lamented this view by saying 
In Canada we have workers who are not willing to make downward adjustment 
in their incomes in order to get a job. To a large extent that is the fault of the 
unemployment insurance system .... Many unemployed workers who comfortably 
live on (UI) for up to a year simply do not beat the pavement looking for jobs 
that pay less (p. 44) 
This protection provided by unemployment compensation which is perceived to make 
the experience of unemployment less costly to those covered, is blamed not only for 
preventing capital from driving down its labour costs but also for increasing unemployment and 
its duration. According to the Macdonald Commission (Minister of Supply and Services, 1985) 
"this protection can increase both employee turnover and the duration of unemployment job 
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search"(Vol. II p. 595). The Macdonald Commission criticized the "generosity" of the 1971 Act 
and attributed a 1-2 percentage point increase in unemployment to this generosity. The report 
blamed the Act for increasing the duration of unemployment, for reinforcing the 
concentration of temporary and unstable jobs in high-unemployment regions, for 
encouraging temporary lay-offs and for subsidizing some workers' income. It was noted 
by the Commission that Ul increases unemployment in the following ways 
First, by making unemployment relatively"cheaper" for individuals, it has, in 
some cases, a negative effect on the job search. Secondly by providing through 
its benefits, it encourages regular cyclical unemployment; again by providing 
extended benefits in some areas, but not others, it discourages labour force 
adjustment (Vol II , p. 815) . 
It is argued that "frictional" unemployment (part of which is bel ieved to be caused by 
the insured unemployed taking longer time to look for a job) depends partly on the amount of 
subsidy provided by unemployment insurance. The implication here is that the more generous 
the levels of income replacement, the longer the duration of unemployment. For example , the 
rise in the non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU) in the 70' s was blamed on 
the 1971 revision of the unemployment insurance program which increased the coverage, 
entitlements and benefits of the insured unemployed. As noted above, the Commission argued 
that this revision had a significant effect on Canada's unemployment rate by increasing it by 1 
to 2 percentage points. It was also said to have prolonged the duration of unemployment by 
1.4 to 2 weeks. The reduction of benefits and entitlements as a result of the 1979 changes 
likewise is said to have translated into a reduction of the NAIRU (Vol. II , p. 604) . As Stanford 
(1996) observes, the NAIRU, according to this view is "actually disguised voluntary 
unemployment and results largely from individuals choosing to collect social benefits rather 
than effectively offering their labour services to the market" (p.139). In addition to this view, it is 
also held that unemployment benefits contribute to a greater labour force participation than 
might otherwise have been in their absence. The argument is that some workers join the 
labour force only with the prospect of collecting unemployment benefits and thereby inflate the 
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labour force participation rate (Nakamura, 1996; Macdonald Commission , 1985). The 
Commission whose views are now being echoed by the federal government stated that 
" ... there are some workers in all industries and regions who prefer a lifestyle of intermittent 
work punctuated by the regular spells of unemployment subsidized by Ul benefits" (Vol. II 605-
6) . The criticism of the program was followed by recommendations to reduce the benefit rates 
to 50% (reduction of ten percent) and increase the qualifying period by 166%.These 
recommendations were meant to impose stronger "workforce attachment" and promote 
market efficiency. 
The Commission' s report was shortly followed by the government's action of removing 
social responsibility for the unemployed in 1989-90 through Bill C-21 (the removal of 
government contributions to the Ul fund) . This is now followed by further assault on the 
scheme through yet another reform in 1996- the introduction of Bill C-12. In its introduction to 
the new legislation (Bill C-12) and in concert with the neoconservative view, the government 
(HRDC, 1995) stated that: 
the new program (EI) will be restructured to reinforce the value of work. It will 
replace (a) Ul system which discourages some people from working ... and 
some employers from creating jobs ... (EI) removes some of the barriers to 
work ... (it) will discourage claimants from relying on the system to 
supplement their incomes .... (workers) will be required to show longer 
attachment to the workforce before qualifying (emphasis added) (p. 2-3) . 
It is further noted in the same publications that the Ul system does seem to lengthen 
unemployment as some people are inclined to collect Ul rather than take work that is available. 
The government, echoing capital's arguments, states that "UI competes with business .. .for 
workers ... (and) ... people are better off collecting Ul than accepting (available) work (HRDC, 
1995, Backgrounder, 4). This reflects capital's arguments that jobless workers receiving Ul 
benefits are not succumbing to the low-wage needs of capital. This view was reiterated by the 
Chrietien government which stated that "low-wage jobs cannot compete (with Ul ) and 
employers offering lower wage jobs cannot find employees they need to run their business. 
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They can not compete with Ul. In this way Ul stifles job creation" (HRDC, 1995:9). Thus, the 
collective, albeit reluctant, provision of some protection from the hazards of the economy is 
seen as an obstacle to jobs that "pay less" or to employers "offering lower- wage jobs". 
The neo-conservative views pertaining to unemployment insurance and its effects on 
the working class and the economy have been challenged by various studies. The following is 
a brief discussion of the findings from these studies. 
Does UJ increase the rate of unemployment? Phillips (1986) summarizes studies 
conducted to estimate the impact of income replacement on unemployment. These studies 
estimate the increase in unemployment rate, especially that caused by the liberalization of the 
program in 1971 , to be in the range from 0% to 1.3%, depending on the different methodology 
and data sets used in the estimate. One of the studies quoted by Phillips concludes that Ul 
would contribute 1% to the unemployment rate only if it was assumed that there was no 
involuntary unemployment; since such an assumption is unrealistic, the estimate must be 
significantly lower than 1%. The study conducted by Corak and Stephen (1995) also rejects 
the assertion that extended benefits prolonged the unemployment duration by 1.4 weeks. The 
authors wrote, " ... we argue that there is no evident direct mechanism from regional extended 
Ul benefits, as generated by the .. . legislation changes, that could account for the increased 
persistence of Canadian unemployment in the 1980s" (p. 566). Despite the ambiguity of the 
findings of some of the studies, and despite the conflicting conclusions, the ideologically driven 
neo-conservative analysis of unemployment portrays income replacement as driving 
unemployment upwards. This view or analysis is contrary to the dynamics of capitalism which 
requires a reserved army of labour. It also tends to ignore that income replacement has the 
stabilizing effect on the economy by providing continued consumption on demand. 
Phillips (1986) points to the inconsistency in the neo-conservative arguments that 
unemployment increases because workers remain voluntarily unemployed due to the 
availability and the 'generosity' of income replacement. As he explains, " voluntary 
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unemployment. .. result(s) in a rise in the rate of unemployment only if there are no other 
unemployed workers in the entire labour market willing or able to take the job".(p.18) 
(emphasis in origin) . Phillips also points out that the army of the unemployed includes new 
entrants to-the labour market, disqualified workers (disqualified from benefits), those who 
exhaust their benefits as well as those whose benefits are too low to remain unemployed. This 
implies that Ul cannot, with any certainty, be accountable to the increase as well as the 
duration of unemployment. It should also be noted that the majority of the unemployed are job-
losers as opposed to job-leavers; the latter include those who depart from their jobs due to 
illness or family responsibilities. If these two categories of job-leavers are excluded from the 
voluntary component of the unemployed, the percentage of those forced out of employment 
due to various circumstances beyond their control increases (Sharpe et al. 1988). The view of 
this study concurs with this conclusion. 
Does the 'generosity' of income replacement levels act as disincentive to work, 
thereby causing voluntary unemployment? The government's (HRDC, 1995) carefully 
worded answer to this question is that 
[F]or some workers ... it (UI) has become an alternative to work .. . the Ul system 
itself discourages people from working for longer periods of time .. . Some people 
may be inclined to collect Ul rather than take work that is available. Ul benefits 
can discourage people from accepting available work .. . (p.3). 
The assumption underlying this view is that workers prefer leisure to work and that the 
only motive or incentive to work is the desire for income. Therefore, if there is any other source 
of income, the worker will stop working. As Corak (1993) observes, this implies that people are 
"utility or economic maximizers" who are willing to work only with the prospect of collecting Ul 
benefits soon after reaching the entry requirement of the program. This leads towards less 
employment and/or unemployment because some people choose to collect benefits upon 
meeting the entry requirement. However, this view remains silent about the fact that going from 
employment earnings to unemployment insurance means an automatic reduction of workers' 
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income by at least 45%; this reduction usually means a fall of income below the poverty level 
for many workers. In 1994 when average earnings were $567.00 per week, the average 
income replacement was $258.00 per week (Statistics Canada, catalogue# 73-202s various 
years). When this income replacement is divided by the standard full-time working hours of 40 
per week, the hourly rate comes down to $6.50 an hour. This level of income translates into 
poverty level of income in many cities of Canada. For a single income family, it may mean a 
fall in income below that provided by social assistance in some jurisdictions (see Appendix 2) . 
Does the income replacement undermine small business efforts to create jobs? As 
it was pointed out in the preceding pages, the government's response to this question, as 
expressed during the introduction of the new legislation, was that low- paying jobs cannot 
compete with Ul and, therefore, they are deterred from creating jobs. What is not clear about 
this contention is the targeted workers and their wage level. Small business usually pays 
minimum wages ($7 .15 an hour in British Columbia). Those who find themselves unemployed 
from minimum wage jobs end up with income replacement of 55% of the minimum wage in the 
event of insured unemployment. For B.C. minimum wage earners, this means a fall in income 
to $3.93 an hour. The argument posed here does not seem to hold ground unless the relatively 
higher-paid workers are the targets or those sought for minimum wage jobs. Should this be the 
case, then Ul does become an obstacle or disincentive to minimum-wage jobs by providing 
some workers with income replacement above the minimum wage. 
The 'disincentive' hypothesis, that is the neo-conservative assertion that high taxation , 
social spending and unemployment compensation increase the unemployment rate , was 
refuted by Therborn (1986) . Therborn compared sixteen countries, one of which was Canada, 
to determine the causes of unemployment, and concluded that 
unemployment levels and unemployment increases are associated neither with 
the level nor growth rates of taxation, or social expenditure .. . there is also 
apparently no relationship between the income replacement rates of 
unemployment and unemployment (p. 66). 
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The reduction of deficits is another justification for making changes to the program 
although it (the program) is self-financed. It was noted in the preceding pages that the 
government has withdrawn its contributions to the fund in 1990. Therefore, U I, as a program 
entirely financed by premiums levied from workers and employers cannot contribute to the 
deficit. As Wiggins (1996) notes, " ... even when Ul accounts are in deficit, the legislation 
requires an increase in premiums to balance the account" (p.18); and if the government 
advances some benefits in the event of a shortfall in the fund , it is later recouped with interest. 
Furthermore, it is unrealistic to assume that curtailment of income replacement or restricting 
access to the program would help reduce the deficit. Those who are disentitled will only make 
a fast track transition to the social assistance which is wholly funded through tax revenue. That 
the welfare costs rise with the increase of unemployment and with the reduction and/or 
restriction of unemployment insurance was demonstrated in a study conducted in Manitoba in 
the 1980s (Phillips, 1986). 
Despite the above noted findings, however, the federal government chose to focus on 
the supply side rather than the demand side of the labour market to supposedly reduce the 
unemployment rate. The strategy chosen is to deprive some of the workers from the 
temporary cushion provided by income replacement and to reduce the benefits of the insured 
unemployed. This strategy increases the vulnerability of the working class to the 'natural' 
forces of the market. Taken to the extreme, and as noted by Kerans (1990) , this strategy is 
based on the assumption that "only exposure to the full force of the market without any safety 
nets or cushion, will force people to take any job anywhere at any wage, and this will solve 
Canada' s unemployment problem" (p. 54). 
In addition to the above arguments and included among the government's reasons for 
the introduction of the Employment Insurance was to respond to the "inflexibility" of the labour 
market. The government's Green paper, Agenda: Jobs and Growth, Improving Social Security 
in Canada (HRDC, 1994,cited by Stanford 1996), refers to 'fostering labour mobility', finding 
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'ways to increase the flexibility of the system' and 'promoting flexible work arrangement' 
(p. 130). What is not clear about this argument pertaining to the labour market flexibility is that 
it is made at a time when it is precisely changing and has become, as Stanford (1996) 
observes "hyper f/exib/e"(p . 132). As the author notes, 
the degree of employment volatility has clearly increased, the security of job 
tenure has been almost universally weakened, and the expansion of non-
standard work arrangements has added on extra dimension of flexibility to the 
allocation of labour. In short, Canada has developed a 'just-in-time labour 
market; labour is increasingly hired precisely when and where it is needed and 
discarded immediately upon becoming redundant (p. 132). 
It is appropriate at this point to introduce the workforce most affected by the changes in 
the scheme, namely, those in non-standard forms of employment. Although the reform is 
designed to increase the vulnerability of the working class in general to the forces of the 
market place, it is the thesis of this paper that those employed in the non-standard forms of 
employment are the hardest hit by these changes. The following section of the paper identifies 
this workforce. 
Non-standard Employment 
Non-standard employment includes part-time employment (working under 30 hours a 
week), casual/on call, contract and temporary work as well as multiple job-holding, some of 
which are referred to as atypical, precarious, contingent or just-in-time employment 
(Schellenberg and Clark, 1996), or the disposable and/or throwaway workers as Aronowitz 
and DiFazio (1994) call them. 
The rapid introduction of technology has enabled capital not only to reduce and/or 
eliminate labour but also to redefine the traditional employee-employer, full-time-full-year 
relationships in Canada and other industrialized societies. Millions of workers are now 
precariously employed (Gorz, 1994). These types of jobs have become a new way of doing 
business and organizing work that spells the end of secure, long term employment for 
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practically every worker of every collar (Schellenberg and Clark, 1996). In 1995, the magazine, 
Management today, reflected this view by putting the following on its front page: 
No stability No security No career welcome to the new deal. .. The emerging work 
paradox is that in the post job world, the only viable long-term career is that of a 
temp ... (cited by Dunkerley, 1996:60) . 
The technological innovations in general and that of computer-aided design and 
production in particular, is causing displacement of skilled workers as well as reduction of 
hours of work; more is produced with less workers and less hours (Gorz, 1994; Aronowitz and 
DiFazio, 1994). The result is a reduction and elimination of workers even as productivity rises. 
As private investment is for profit and not for employment, labour-saving or labour-cost 
containment is the primary goal of capital when it invests in new machinery and computers. 
This implies that part-time, temporary and 'just-in-time' employment replace full-time-full-year 
employment. These types of employment, in addition to the self employed now account for 
about one in three Canadian jobs (Statistics Canada, 1995; Schellenberg and Clark, 
1996).When these workforce and the unemployed (9.6% in 1997) are taken together, we see 
that 42.6% of the labour force were or are at the margins of the productive labour market. 
(i) Part-time Employment 
Part-time employment in Canada has been on the rise since the 1950s. The trend in 
part-time work accelerated during the two recessions (1981-81 and 1991-92) alongside the 
shift from goods producing jobs to services producing jobs. As shown in chart 1, part-time rate 
rose from year to year throughout the twenty years from 1977 to 1996; the proportion of 
workers in these types of jobs climbed by 6.9% (from 13% in 1977 to 18.9% in 1996) during 
this time. However these rates do not capture the whole army of part-timers. Those who hold 
multiple jobs and work for thirty hours or more a week between two or more jobs are not 
included in these rates. Krahn (1995) notes that when all part-time labourers (including multiple 
jobholders) are considered , "the number of part-time jobs actually increased at an average rate 
of 6.9% annually, compared to 1.5% for full-time jobs" (p. 36) . Strictly looking at those 
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classified as part-timers by Statistics Canada (those who work under 30 hours a week), we 
Chart 1 
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witness the acceleration of part-time in the early 1981-82 to about 16%; and in 1992-93 it 
climbed to 19%. Alongside this growth of non-standard form of employment was the decline of 
full-time employment. In 1982 full-time employment declined by 4.4% (424,000) from the year 
before. Between 1990 and 1991 full-time employment was reduced by 3.6% (355,000) while 
that of part-time grew by 4.5%; the following year (1992) witnessed a decline of 451,000 of full-
time employment in comparison to four years earlier, while part-time grew by 206,000 during 
the same time (all figures taken from Statistics Canada, 1996; see also Appendix 1 ). In 
absolute terms the number of the partially unemployed doubled between 1977 and 1996 from 
1.3 million to 2.6 million. In contrast, full-time jobs increased by about 28% in the last twenty 
years. The annual percentage growth of part-time exceeded that of full-time in all but six years 
out of the twenty. 
Throughout the growth years of the 1980s, part-time rate remained high indicating that 
economic expansion does not necessarily entail growth in full-time jobs. Neither did the growth 
reverse or arrest the perpetuation of the ongoing shift to these types of employment 
conditions. This movement away from the permanent full-time jobs to part-time or contingent 
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work suggests that the traditional mechanism through which Canadian workers have met their 
basic needs is being challenged (see table 2) . 
Table 2 Combinations of non-standard employment by age, sex and industry 
Year 
Total 
Women 
15-24 
25-34 
35-44 
45-54 
55-65 
Men 
15-24 
25-34 
35-44 
45-54 
55-65 
Industry 
Agriculture 
Natural resourc-based 
Manufacturing 
Construction 
Distributive services 
Business services 
Social services 
Public administration 
Retail trade 
Other consumer 
services 
One or more of part-time work, (self 
employed, multiple jobholding 
counted only once) 
% of total employment 
1989 1994 
28 33 
35 40 
49 64 
30 33 
35 37 
31 35 
35 41 
22 27 
41 52 
18 25 
16 22 
19 19 
22 30 
54 65 
10 14 
13 14 
28 45 
19 23 
24 33 
35 39 
16 21 
40 42 
48 47 
Source: statistics Canada, 75-001 E, Perspectives on Labour and Income. 
Self employed are excluded from the calculation under industries. 
Work only '(counted only once) 
Part-time and/or temporary 
(%) 
1989 
19 
29 
46 
24 
26 
24 
28 
11 
37 
8 
4 
3 
12 
9 
6 
8 
16 
10 
12 
28 
13 
34 
36 
1994 
21 
29 
54 
22 
25 
23 
30 
14 
45 
12 
7 
6 
9 
19 
10 
9 
20 
11 
15 
30 
16 
31 
32 
Many among the part-timers are forced into such jobs because they could not find full-
time employment. The number of these involuntary part-time workers, like in all other non-
standard forms of employment, has been increasing. Twenty years ago, involuntary part-time 
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was 10% of all part-time jobs at 167,600. By 1997, there were 852,000 people holding part-
time jobs involuntarily. In 1994 when the part-time employment stood at 2.25 million, 35.2% of 
them nationwide, 59.6% in Newfoundland, 46% in Nova-Scotia and 45.8% in new-Brunswick 
reported that they were holding part-time jobs because they could not find full-time 
employment (Statistics Canada, 1995). 
As shown in Table 2 the labour market flexibility advocated for by capital and sought 
for by the government has long been in the making as evinced by the perpetuation of part-time 
employment. Faced with this difficult labour market condition, high unemployment, cost cutting 
and employers' demand for 'worker flexibility' and 'wage flexibility', many Canadians are not 
only accepting part-time jobs but are supplementing one part-time job with another to make a 
near decent living. Multiple job-holding is now becoming common as a result. In 1996, one in 
twenty workers held a second job or business , as compared to one in fifty in 1976 (Statistics 
Canada, Catalogue #71-005-XPB) . Between 1976 and 1994, the number of multiple 
jobholders grew by 455% to 950,000. Seventy eight percent of all multiple jobholders , or 
737,000 of them were those aged 25 years and above; 49% of this group were men and 51% 
women (Krahn, 1995). 
(ii) Non-permanent Employment 
As noted earlier and pointed out by Heisz (1996), "employers are tailoring job spells to 
respond to fluctuations in demand, with the result that offers of a long term employment are on 
a decline ... firms are increasingly using a core of full-time ... and hiring temporary workers when 
the need arises" (p.31) . In 1991 over half a million of paid employees worked in jobs whose 
duration was six months or less; and by 1994 the number of temporary workers climbed close 
to a million (970,000) . Those aged 15-24 years were over represented in this workforce 
(Krahn, 1995). Grenon and Chun (1997) bring this number of the non-permanent workers to 
11% or 1.3 million in 1995. 
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Temporary employment is not restricted to the private sector; the public sector also 
contributes its share in this development. Schellenberg and Clark (1996) explain that this type 
of employment in the federal public services increased from about 13% of the total 
employment in the early 1980s to 17% in the early 1990s. 
These types of jobs are also found in all industries and occupations. Although the 
goods producing sector also employs part-time and temporary workers, the bulk of such 
employment is found in the service producing sector. For example, 33% of the temporary jobs 
and 80% of the multiple jobholders were employed in this sector; 500,000 or 83% of the 
multiple jobholders employed by the service sector worked for services and trades (Krahn, 
1995). 
Occupations and other professions are not shielded from the vulnerability that comes 
with non-permanent jobs. The concept of 'human capital ' and investment in education , useful 
as it might be, does not seem to provide immunity from the instability in employment and 
economic insecurity; Schellenberg and Clark (1996) point out that half of the adults holding 
temporary jobs have completed post secondary education. Government downsizing and 
corporate lean and mean strategies have created temporary employment in all occupations 
including professionals, managers, programmers, accountants, engineers, teachers and health 
care workers. The latter two and managers accounted for about 25% of the temporary 
workers in Canada according to Schellenberg and Clark (1996). 
Wage and Labour Flexibility: the Advantage to 
Capital and the Disadvantage to Labour 
The temporary, part-time, casual , 'just-in-time' labourers compose a workforce that can 
be deployed, redeployed and disposed of according to the shifting needs of capital. This 
composition of the workforce which makes up the nomadic army of the labour force can be 
utilized by the employers who need a quick response to short term changes in demand for 
their products or services. As DuRivage (1992) suggests, these strategies employed by capital 
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can be characterized as a "search for static flexibility in the pursuit of cheap labour, and, 
immediate adjustment to changing market conditions in destandardization of the terms of 
employment, making hours of work more flexible and unpredictable" (p. 8) . The short term 
assignments, the setting of terms and conditions of employment at the individual level (as 
opposed to groups/unions) provides employers with the flexibility that frees them from an 
obligation or commitment to an employee. It enables the employer to respond to fluctuations in 
demands for their products and cuts labour costs and wages accordingly. As a hand-book 
written for employers by Lewis and Molloy (1991) spells 
companies are striving to maintain the minimum workforce necessary to 
handle their daily workload ... [they] have discovered that using temporary help 
enables them to operate with greater efficiency, minimize their obligations, 
and maintain greater control over their costs (p. 4) .(emphasis added). 
Cutting back on staff and reorganizing or restructuring jobs mean not only a reduction 
of annual wage payments but also savings in non-wage personnel costs which include fringe 
benefits, payroll taxes, workers compensation, vacation pay, maternity leave, holiday pay and 
pension plans. It is also useful to capital for replacing an employee without long term 
obligations. Temporary employees can fill short term needs at low cost and little notice, even in 
specialized and professional fields (Lewis and Molloy, 1991). Employers who use non-standard 
employment are much less likely to come up against demands and/or resistance for higher 
wages. Part-time and 'just-in-time' employment are also useful in hiring new bottom tier in 
order to keep labour costs down. A large pool of 'flexible' and disposable labour force also 
helps depress wages of all workers (Noble, 1995; DuRivage, 1992). 
Needless to say, counter to these advantages to capital are the disadvantages to 
labour; not only do the precariously employed lose benefits or receive them at a reduced rates 
when compared to the full-time workers, but they also receive lower hourly rates, work on 
average less hours and have less job security (DuRivage, 1992; Schellenberg and Clark, 
1996; Eatwell, 1996; Krahn, 1995). Even within the lowpaying industries, part-timers and 
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temporary workers receive lower hourly earnings than full-time workers doing the same job 
(Eatwell, 1996). Similarly, Schellenberg and Clark (1996) note that "with reduced hours and 
lower wages, the weekly earnings among [the non-standard] workers in some occupations, 
such as sales and services, professional and managerial. .. are several hundred dollars below 
those of their counterparts" (p. 18). 
The spread of non-standard employment feeds greater income inequality not only 
between the 'core' workers (the ever shrinking full-time workers) and the contingent workers 
but also their families. These types of employment are associated with poverty among workers 
and their families (DuRivage, 1992). The disadvantage that these workforce faces during 
employment puts it at a further disadvantage in relationship to unemployment benefits in the 
event of transition from being partially- employed to being fully- unemployed. Not only are 
they more vulnerable to repeated spells of unemployment when compared to those in full-time 
employment, and, therefore, more likely to need unemployment benefits, but they are also 
penalized by the reform (EI) , for that very fact as will be shown in the following section. 
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Section 3 
Bill C-12:The Changes and Their Impact 
The government introduced the El program reminding the working class that its main 
intent or the 'overarching objectives are to remove barriers to paid employment', 'to reinforce 
the value of work', 'to reduce ongoing reliance' on the program, 'to improve incentives for paid 
work' and to increase the 'flexibility' of the labour market" (HRDC, 1995; 1996). It has targeted 
the Ul program because it, like its neo-conservative advisors (Nakamura, 1995; 1996), 
perceives Ul as a structural obstacle to the achievement of the objectives described above. 
As the following discussion of the changes and their impact shows, Bill C-12 is 
designed to accomplish the desired 'flexibility' and 'work value' by limiting and restricting the 
unemployed workers· access to the program and benefits, and by increasing their vulnerability 
to the forces of the market. It does this by lowering benefit rates, by reducing the maximum 
weeks of benefits, by penalizing 'repeat users', by reducing the maximum insurable earnings, 
by increasing the entrance/re-entrance requirements and by reducing access to maternity and 
parental benefits of the new entrants. El introduces changes whereby benefits will be based 
directly on a worker's past employment history, hours of work, and earnings (HRDC, 1995). 
Eligibility: The Shift From Weeks to Hours Worked 
Bill C-12 bases eligibility for regular and special benefits on hours rather than weeks 
worked in the previous 52 weeks. The duration of benefits is also based on hours worked. 
Under this new eligibility criterion , hours of work from all places of work are included for the 
purposes of qualifying for income replacement in the event of unemployment. One of the 
reasons for the shift from weeks to hours, according to the government (HRDC, 1994) is to 
extend coverage to those who were excluded from the Ul program. These include workers 
in non-standard forms of employment holding multiple jobs and those whose weekly hours of 
work were less than 15 hours a week. As suggested by the government, 
the total number of jobs in Canada grew from 14.1 million in 1986 to 14.8 
million in 1990, which amounted to a growth of five percent over a five year 
period .... Jobs covered by Ul experienced a modest growth of 2.4 percent (from 
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11.4 million to 11 .7 million) , but jobs excluded from Ul grew at a much faster 
pace of 16 percent (from 2.7 million to 3.1 million)" (cited in Nakamura, 1996, 
p.745) . 
The problem with basing eligibility to the program on weeks worked , according to the 
government, was that it did not consider the needs of the 3.1 million workers who are 
employed part-time, in temporary jobs and the moonlighters whose hours of work varied from 
week to week. The change is also intended to pre-empt employers' avoidance of paying 
premiums by hiring workers for under 15 hours a week. 
However, the inclusion of all employees in the non-standard forms of employment in 
the coverage is only an appearance rather than reality. The El guidelines defeat the very 
purpose of extension of coverage to this group of workers by imposing strict eligibility criterion 
and making the program less accessible to them. It does this by increasing the hours required 
to qualify by 233% from 12-20 weeks (only weeks of 15 hours or more or $163 earnings per 
week) or 180-300 hours under the previous Act, to hours ranging from 420-700 (12-20 weeks 
of 35 hours each) depending on the regional unemployment rate. As Pulkingham (1998, 
forthcoming) observes, " ... the government has removed any progressivity by increasing 
dramatically the number of hours of work required to qualify for El and by opting for a 35 
hour/week conversion" (forthcoming) . 
The increase of hours of work required to qualify as indicated above makes it difficult 
for part-time, temporary, seasonal workers to qualify for benefits. It restricts access to 
regular as well as special benefits of many workers while it disqualifies or excludes others . This 
is recognized by the government (HRDC, 1996) when it states that in the event of 
unemployment, "about 90,000 individuals will be potentially excluded from receiving insurance 
benefits under the reform unless they increase their hours of paid work" (p. 7) . Some of this 
workforce involves new/re-entrants who would be disentitled because they cannot meet this 
requirement. Among the disentitled, many will pay premiums if they earn above $2000 a year. 
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The hours-based eligibility criterion and the replacement of 15 hours-week by the new 
35 hour/week conversion will affect all workers except those in a full-time-full-year jobs. Part-
timers whose population was 2,773,000 in 1996 will find it more difficult to qualify for benefits 
at times of unemployment. It is estimated that 75% of this population will have difficulties 
accessing the program (CCSO, 1996). Women will be the hardest hit among this workforce for 
they comprise 78% of the part-timers who work less than 34 hours a week. This implies that 
maternity, parental and adoption benefits, most of which are claimed by women will also suffer. 
Workers in non-permanent jobs who comprised 11% of the workforce (or almost 1.3 
million) in 1995 (Grenon & Chun, 1997) will find it difficult to qualify for benefits as well. 
Although, as pointed out in the preceding pages, premiums will be levied on all hours worked, 
those who work 15 hours a week or less will have difficulties meeting the variable entrance 
requirements. In 1995, 6.5% of the labour force or 877,890 worked less than 15 hours a week 
(Statistics Canada, cat# 71-005-XPB). More than 50% of this workforce were women. 
Among those employed in non-standard forms of jobs and who will have coverage for 
the first time are the multiple jobholders whose hours of work between two or more jobs add up 
to the standard hours of 35 - 40 a week. However, not all of the workforce in this category will 
gain; about one in ten of the multiple jobholders in 1996 worked less than 15 hours a week at 
their main jobs and their combined jobs averaged 17.3 hours a week in 1996 (Statistics 
Canada, cat# 71-005-XPB). 
According to the government's own information and analysis (HRDC, 1996b), about 
500,000 part-timers will be insured for the first time (see Table 3). Fifty four percent of this 
workforce or 270,000 are women and 230,000 (46%) are men. Ninety thousand workers , 
47,000 of whom are women and 43,000 men will be excluded from receiving benefits as per 
the government's information unless they increase their hours of work. Of the 270,000 newly 
insured women paying premiums, 200,000 of them wi ll not qual ify for benefits and will have 
their premiums refunded through the tax system. Of the remaining 70,000, only 23,000 will 
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qualify for benefits. This brings the percentage of the newly insured women and who will 
qualify for benefits to 4.6% of the total (500,000) newly insured. 
The number for men who will qualify for benefits is similar to that of women as shown in 
Table 3. The information compiled from HRDC (1996) and Pulkigham's (1998) work shows 
230,000 of the newly insured part-timers are men; and 176,000 of this workforce do not qualify 
as their incomes are $2000 or under and will, therefore, have refunds. This implies that 54,000 
will pay premiums and receive no refunds as their income is over $2,000/year. Since, as 
mentioned above, and as per the government's information, 43,000 men will be disqualified 
unless they increase their hours of work, only the remaining 11,000 or 2.2% of all the newly 
insured will qualify for benefits. In total only 6.8% part-timers will qualify for benefits in the 
event of unemployment. Having contended that the weeks-based qualification criterion under 
the old system was unfair to the part-timers and having identified the growth of this workforce 
excluded from Ul (the 3.1 million), the government not only sets out to restrict access to the 
Table 3. The Newly Insured, Nominal Extension of coverage 
Total Men Women 
Total Newly Insured 500,000 230,000 270,000 
(100%) (46%) (54%) 
Disqualified -- with current hours of 90,000 43,000 47,000 
work (100%) (48%) (52%) 
Newly Insured -- but not qualifying 376,000 176,000 200,000 
(premiums to be refunded) (100%) (76.5%) (74%) 
Qualifying for Benefits 34,000 11,000 23,000 
Percent Qualifying 6.8% 2.2% 4.6% 
(Source: Compiled from HRDC, 1996 & Pulkingham, 1998 (forthcoming) 
program but it also disentitles previously insured and qualified part-timers; 16% of Ul claimants 
who were qualified under Ul will be excluded from benefits under this new arrangement in El. 
(Pulkingham, 1998, forthcoming) . The "extension of coverage" to the non-standard forms of 
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employment, therefore, has an exclusionary effect on the workforce in this category in general, 
including those who were previously covered under the old system. 
The main purpose of this change (the shift from weeks-based to hours-based 
requirement), therefore, is to align the program with insurance principles by striping it of its 
safety-net provision. It is meant, as Nakamura (1996) who is an advocate of such change 
contends, to make the program a user-funded insurance program with stricter adherence to 
insurance principles. 
The effect of the conversion from weeks to hours-based requirements , in conjunction 
with the stringent requirements for new/ re-entrants (discussed below) accelerates the decline 
of beneficiaries, which according to Statistics Canada, has already fallen from 86.9% of the 
unemployed in January of 1989 to 38% in December of 1996 (see chart 1). As HRDC (1996) 
itself points out, " ... the hours based system will disproportionately affect women by increasing 
the hours of work required to qualify and by lowering the number of weeks of benefits if they 
are unable to increase their hours of work" (p. 7). 
Chart 2 
The Declining Ratio of Regular Beneficiaries 
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37 
The decline in beneficiaries as a result of disentitlements, the reduction of benefits and 
the duration thereof has already resulted in $15.7 billion surplus in El fund (Radio CBC, 1998). 
New/Re-entrants 
New-and-re-entrants to the labour market will be the hardest hit by the changes in the 
hours required to qualify for benefits. Under Ul, the requirement was 20 weeks of at least 15 
hours each (300 hours) . It is now tripled to 910 hours (26 weeks of 35 hours each) of insurable 
hours under El. A new/re-entrant is a worker who 52 weeks preceding his or her qualifying 
period had less than 490 hours (14 weeks x 35 hours/week) of insurable hours. This workforce 
has to demonstrate labour-force attachment of 910 hours in a year to qualify for insurance 
benefits. According to this change, part-timers who work 15 hours a week would need close to 
61 weeks (91 0/ 15=60.6) in the qualifying period defined as " .. . the 52 weeks period 
immediately before the beginning of a benefit period .. .. "(Bill C-111 section 8(1)(a)). 
The purpose of this change and the tripling of the entrance requirement is to reduce 
the reliance of the unemployed on the program and to force workers to rely on the labour 
market that does not secure jobs for all those who want and need it. Despite the growing 
unemployment rate, the government (HRDC, 1996) claims that the restriction of access to 
benefits will "remove disincentives and pre-empt a cycle of dependency on El" (p. 7) 
(emphasis added) . This reform measure has the effect of increasing the number of workers 
who will be excluded from qualification and/or entitlements. The exclusionary effect of this 
measure, as Pulkingham (1998) notes, "will be felt most acutely in the Atlantic provinces, 
especially Newfoundland, where unemployment rates regularly exceed 12 percent .. . and 
(where) seasonal claimants represented 58 percent of all claimants"(forthcoming). Seasonal 
and temporary workers whose work lasts less than six months a year (even at the 35 
hours/week conversion) , and those with less than 35 hours a week would never qualify for 
benefits. For example, a study conducted in 1987 showed that 17% of temporary workers were 
between jobs (i.e. unemployed) for 52 weeks after termination of their temporary employment; 
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24% of them remained unemployed for 24 weeks and 31% of them for 12 weeks 
(Schellenberg & Clark, 1996). This workforce, therefore, would certainly have difficulties 
accumulating the necessary 910 hours to qualify for benefits even if their six month term jobs 
are at 35 hours a week. Women and "other disadvantaged groups" as Wiggins (1996) 
observes, "will be the primary losers ... As well access to maternity and parental leave may be 
reduced by the new entrance requirements" (p. 77) . 
The casual and the on-call workers who represented one in three (or 433,333) of non-
permanent jobholders in 1995 are not even considered for income replacement due to the 
nature of their jobs which are erratic and scattered and where lay-offs occur before they can 
bank enough time to qualify. The seasonal workers who during the same year represented one 
in seven (or 185,714) of the non-permanent workforce (Statistics Canada, 1996) as well as 
contract workers are exposed to more spells of unemployment and are the hardest hit by the 
change in the program. 
The Fixed Averaging Period and the "divisor" 
Under the Ul program, benefit levels were based on averaging weekly insurable 
earnings in the last 12 to 20 weeks of work over a 52 week period, depending on the regional 
unemployment rate. For example for a worker living in a high- unemployment region , the entry 
requirement was 12 weeks (20 weeks for low-unemployment areas) and the benefit was based 
on total earnings during the last twelve weeks of work (the last twenty weeks for low-
unemployment regions) . This formula for calculating benefits was seen as a "disincentive" that 
discouraged workers from working more than just the basic entry requirements (HRDC, 
1996a). The solution , according to the government, was to average earnings over a 'fixed 
period' of 26 consecutive weeks (the 26 weeks preceding termination of employment) . It has 
also introduced the concept of the "divisor' which is two weeks more than the minimum entry 
requirement ( ranging from 14 weeks to 22 weeks, depending on the regional unemployment 
rate), expressed in 35 hour weeks (see table 4). 
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Table 4 
Fixed Averaging Formula under El; and the Shift from Weeks to Hours 
Worked: Comparison between El & Ul 
Unemployment 
Rate 
6% & under 
over 6% to 7% 
over 7% to 8% 
over 8% to 9% 
over 9% to 1 0% 
over 1 0% to 11 o/o 
over 11% to 12% 
over12% to 13% 
over 13% 
entry 
require-
ment 
expressed 
in weeks 
of 35 hrs 
each-EI 
20 
19 
18 
17 
16 
15 
14 
13 
12 
Minimum 
entry 
require-
entry under Ul 
require- expressed 
ment in weeks 
under El , of15hrs 
in hours each 
700 300 
655 285 
630 270 
595 255 
560 240 
525 225 
490 210 
455 195 
420 180 
Benefits 
Excluded fall below 
with these 55% if hrs 
hours of 
work 
Under El 
699 
654 
629 
594 
559 
525 
480 
454 
419 
of work 
are less 
than 
770 
735 
700 
655 
630 
595 
560 
525 
490 
Weeks of Benefits 
Divisor* 15 hr-week or 
Under El 40-hour counted 
22 for 1 week of 
benefit 
21 under Ul. 
20 
.•:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:· 
19 Under El, #of hrs. 
18 of work determine 
17 # of benefit weeks; 
16 Under El , less hrs 
15 mean less benefits 
14 & less benefit 
weeks 
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Source: compiled from El Act (1996), schedule I & II. *Under Ul the divisors equaled the number of weeks actually 
worked and insured upto a maximum of twenty weeks. 
According to this concept, a worker who lives in a region with 12% of unemployment 
rate will need 16 weeks (22 weeks for those in low-unemployment rate regions) in order to be 
able to receive the benefit level at 55% of his or her weekly earnings. Claimants who work 
simply the entrance requirements will see a reduction in their benefits below the 55% of the 
maximum benefit level. However, if their weeks of work are higher than the divisor, then the 
former would be used in calculating the benefit levels. 
Since all the weeks in the " fixed averaging period" (also referred to as the Rate 
Calculation Period) are taken into account in calculating benefit levels, this means a reduction 
of benefits for hundreds and thousands of workers who experience gaps in their employment. 
According to HRDC (1996a) 35% or 849,000 of the claimants have gaps in their earnings; 10% 
of all claimants or 250,000 workers experience gaps of four weeks or more. Forty one percent 
of claimants in Newfoundland, 40% in Alberta and 38% in New Brunswick experience gaps 
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falling within the national average of about four weeks. The gaps of weeks without work range 
from 2.9 weeks to 4.8 across the provinces; about 75% of Ul claimants with fewer than 20 
weeks work are found in the Atlantic provinces and Quebec (Wiggins, 1996). Similarly workers 
with gaps in their earnings are found in all sectors. Forty one percent of claimants in 
transportation, 31% in trade sectors, 30% in services and 31% of claimants in manufacturing 
sectors experience gaps in their earnings (all figures taken from HRDC, 1996a p. 6). It is 
estimated that about one million of Ul recipients experience interruptions in earnings (Wiggins, 
1996) . The initial government proposal (Bill C-111 ) was to base the weekly rate of benefits on 
a 16 to 20 week fixed averaging formula as opposed to the revised 14 to 22 weeks shown in 
Table four. The Canadian Labour congress (cited in Wiggins, 1996), in its response to this 
initial proposal estimated that this formula would result in a reduction of 20% to 50% in benefit 
rates; "on average, Ul recipients (would have lost) about $1 ,500 each as a result of the 20-
week fixed average. By 1999, when fully operational , benefit payments to the unemployed 
(would have been) reduced by $1 .5 to $2 billion by this measure alone" (p. 78) . The revision to 
14 to 22 week averaging period may see a reduction comparable to what is stated above. The 
seasonal workers who do not have control over their work and most of whom are concentrated 
in the Atlantic provinces and Quebec, will suffer disproportionately by this formula (CCSD, 
1996). The 55% maximum benefit level that appeared to remain unchanged under the new 
program, therefore, is not available to these workers unless they increase their work weeks to 
exceed the minimum entrance requirement by at least two weeks. 
Intensity Rule: Targeting "Frequent Users" 
The intent of the program (UI) , according to the proponents of the neo-conservative 
view, was to restrict coverage to workers with previous workforce attachment where the event 
of unemployment was unpredictable and not a situation where it was certain to occur; income 
replacement was meant for victims of unavoidable employment. It is, therefore, contended that 
the "original intent" of the Act was contravened by the inclusion of seasonal workers, 
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temporary and other non-permanent workers as beneficiaries, since these workers are 
involved in employment with a predictable or foreseeable termination of employment and 
subsequent joblessness. As a result of inclusion of such categories of workers in the coverage, 
it is argued that the unemployment insurance program has caused dependency whereby 
workers repeatedly cycle in and out of program participation (Nakamura, 1995; Forget et al , 
1986). 
Despite the seasonal nature of some of the industries, and, the intensification by capital 
of "just-in-time' staffing as well as the temporary and contract work, the workforce is blamed for 
involving itself in such employment which inevitably results in participation in the program. 
Nakamura (1995) , contends that 
workers who do not look for new employment immediately following termination 
of employment and go to collect Ul for the duration of the benefit period 
inevitably self-select into jobs that they know will not last (p. 7 41 ). 
Not only does this argument ignore the prevailing high rates of unemployment where 
there is a reserve army of labour more than 1.4 million looking for jobs before new ones join 
ranks, but it also implies that joblessness is self- imposed. The "self-selection" into temporary, 
seasonal and contract work and the subsequent cycle in and out of program participation is 
encouraged, according to the proponents of this view, by the generosity of the program, which 
is easily accessible and the duration of benefits which 'subsidize' the workers annual income. 
Both these issues (self selection and generosity) are blamed for causing a great deal of 
recidivism from a group of workers who are viewed as having little or no preference for 
employment and who are 'trapped' into what Forget et al (Minister of Supply and Service, 
1986) called the "1 0-40 syndrome". This syndrome, according to the report, occurs when 
workers are employed for the minimum amount of weeks required to qualify (1 0 weeks at the 
time) and collecting benefits for up to 40 weeks, and then repeating the cycle. Thus, the 
availability and the 'generosity 'of income replacement leads to the trap of recidivism and/or 
repeat use of the program. This is further encouraged by lack of deterrence or penalty for 
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workers who rely on the scheme time and again as they experience episodes of 
unemployment. 
While the focus of the criticism regarding the repeat use of the program is generally 
directed towards the supply side of labour, some economists include the demand side. Corak 
(1995) notes, the program offers an implicit subsidy to employers who rely on temporary lay-
offs; these employers maintain their attachment to their experienced workers by planning their 
recall decisions according to the benefit entitlement of their temporarily laid off workers. 
Employers, according to this view participate in initiating separation in accordance to the 
qualifying periods and the duration of benefits. Corak· s (1993) study of the distribution of 
repeat-users and the firms that support their claim shows that 40% of those making five or 
more claims come from employment with three or less employers. In other words, these group 
of workers were cycling between insured unemployment and employment with the same firms. 
This is not surprising given that the repeat users are mostly seasonal and temporary workers 
who are in and out of the same or similar jobs. Beside the fact that some industries are 
characterized by seasonality, it is a well known that capital is shrinking its "core" workers and 
surrounding them with "just-in-time" and a temporary labour force resulting in intermittent 
(un)employment for many. 
Unlike the notion of "self-selection" and contrary to the neo-conservative argument that 
some workers quit their jobs to go and collect Ul , or choose intermittent employment 
subsidized by income replacement, the proportion of those who find themselves unemployed 
with no fault of their own is substantial. In 1986-87, 3,323,000 or 36% of those who separated 
from their jobs did so because of job loss. Close to 1.9 million of these workforce lost their jobs 
because their employment was seasonal or temporary. Even if those who departed from their 
jobs because of poor working conditions or low wages are to be blamed for doing so and are 
excluded from those who are forced into joblessness by other circumstances, the number of 
the job losers remains high (Statistics Canada, 1991 ). A study done by Sharpe, et al (1986) 
4 3 
comparing job losers and job leavers (some of whom are forced into leaving their jobs for 
familial reasons or ill health) showed that the former's number rose significantly between the 
years 1975 and 1986. During this time period the number of job losers rose from 39.4% of the 
unemployed to 55% while the number of job-leavers feU from 27.8 percent to 18 percent. If, as 
argued by the neo-conservatives, the "generosity" and easy accessibility of the program was a 
cause for recidivism or increased unemployment and the duration therein, then it follows that 
the reduction in benefits and entitlements should discourage workers from leaving their jobs. 
However, despite the erosion of the program and tightening up of the entrance requirements 
and the benefit period over the last two decades, the proportion of job losers is growing and 
remains high when compared to the number of those who depart from their jobs voluntarily . 
The great majority of workers in 1996, as shown in Table 5, lost their jobs due to lay-offs. 
Those who are categorized as job leavers by comparison are a lot fewer than those forced into 
unemployment. 
Table 5 Unemployment- Job-losers and Job-leavers, Canada & Provinces December 1996 . 
...... ·.·.·.·.·.·,·.· ............. •.•.•.•.•.•.•.•.•.•.•.•.•.•.•.•.•.•.•.•.•.•.•.•.•.•.•,•,•,•,•,•.•,•,•,•,•,•,•.•.•,•.•.•.•.•.•,•.•.•.•,•.•.•.•.•.•.•.•.•.•.•.•.•.•.•.•.•.·.•.• ........... ·.·.·· ·.·.•.·.·,·.·.·.·.·.· ..... ·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.•.•. •.•.•.• .·. ·.·.·.·.·.·.· ..... ·.•.•.·.•.•.•.•.•.•.•.•.•.·.•.•.•.•.•.• . ..-.•.•.•.•.•. . ·,·,·· ,················· ·· ,·· ••••.•.·.·.·. ·.·.·.·.·.·.·. 
Province 
Canada 
Newfoundland 
P.E.I. 
Nova Scotia 
Newbrunswick 
Quebec 
Ontario 
Manitoba 
Saskatchewan 
Alberta 
BC 
Male 
Female 
Total 
Unemployed 
1,412,000 
826,000 
586,000 
43,000 
12,000 
52,000 
44,000 
445,000 
489,000 
41 ,000 
28,000 
88,000 
170,000 
Job-losers %of un- % of un-
lost or laid-off employed Job-leavers employed 
-=·=·=·=·=·=·=·=·=·=·=·=·=·=·=·=·=·=·=·=·=·=·=·=·=·=·=·=·=·=·=·=·=·=·=·=·=·=·=·=·=·=·=·=·=·=·=·=·=·=·=·=·=·=·=·=·=·=·=·=·=·=·=·=·=·=·=·=·=·=·=·=·=·==·:·=·=·=·=·=·=·=·=·=·=·=·=·=·=-=·=·=·=·=·=·=·=·=·=·=·=·=·=·=·=·=·=·=·=·=·=·=·=·=·=·=·=·=·=·=·=·=·=·=·=·=·=·=·:-;.;.;.;.;.;.;.;. 
699,000 49.5 166,000 11.7 
446,000 54.0 98,000 11.8 
253,000 43.1 68,000 11.6 
25,000 58.1 
9,000 75.0 
31 ,000 60.0 5,000 9.6 
27,000 61 .3 5,000 11 .3 
231 ,000 52.0 38,000 8.5 
216,000 44.1 58,000 11 .8 
21,000 51 .2 7,000 17 
14,000 50.0 4,000 14.2 
45,000 51 .0 16,000 18 
79,000 46.4 30,000 17.6 
Source: Statistics Canada, catalogue # 71-001-XPB, Various tables 
The fact that the majority of the unemployed are forced into joblessness has been 
established by a study done by Statistics Canada. This study, cited in Phillips 
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(1986),concluded that in the eighties, 40% to 60% percent of all unemployment resulted from 
lay-offs; the author notes, 
an improvement or deterioration in the unemployment picture manifests itself 
mainly through a decrease or an increase in the number of job losers among the 
unemployed. The ability of job leavers, re-entrants and entrants to find 
employment is clearly not without its effects on the unemployment level , but it is 
proportionally less significant. .. (it has been shown) that job losers play a 
predominant role in defining both the seasonally and the trend of unemployed 
Canadians (p. 22). 
The majority of the repeat-users or those categorized as trapped in the '1 0-40 
syndrome' are those in seasonal employment who are mainly concentrated in the Atlantic 
provinces, Quebec and to an extent the prairie provinces. The major industrial contributors to 
seasonal unemployment in these regions are agriculture, fishing, forestry and the processing 
industries associated with them. Construction is also another contributor to the seasonal 
unemployment. The seasonality of these industries are determined by climate and government 
regulations (Phillips, 1986). This implies that employees, or even employers for that matter, do 
not have control over the seasonality of employment, and neither would restricting the U I 
benefits influence the unemployment spells caused by these natural and economic 
phenomena. Searching for or finding another employment in between seasons in a labour 
market characterized by a persistently high unemployment rate and capital's trimming down of 
the workforce, and where the 'contingent' labour force is abundant is, therefore, not feasible . 
Despite these circumstances, and contrary to the dynamics of capitalism where unemployment 
is inherent, the government seeks to correct the behavior of the insured unemployed by 
imposing the "Intensity rule" . This mechanism, as discussed below, is designed to reduce 
income replacement of the insured unemployed. 
The basic 55% of the weekly earnings of income replacement is no longer available to 
all workers. As explained in the preceding pages, those who experience gaps in their earnings 
and those who claim for benefits after banking the basic entrance requirements of work-hours 
will suffer reductions in their benefits at a time of insured unemployment. Workers are also 
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subjected to further reduction of their benefits if they have prior claims of 20 weeks in the last 
five years. 
The government, under the advisement of the neo-conservative economists , 
introduced this additional mechanism referred to as the "intensity rule" to further reduce the 
benefit rates of the insured unemployed. The economists of the Right orientation (Nakamura, 
1995) proposed that an "experience rating" be introduced as a way of bringing the program 
closer with insurance principles. A firm would be experience rated when and if its taxes vary 
according to the frequency of claims for benefits made by its workers; the higher the claims , 
the more the taxes an employer would be subjected to. On the workers side, experience rating 
is imposed by increasingly reducing benefits depending on prior weeks of Ul collected . The 
government has opted to impose penalties on the supply side despite its recognition that some 
employers plan their recall of temporarily laid-off workers according to the variable entrance 
requirements. It should be pointed out that the architect of this mechanism (Nakamura, 1995) 
has objected to the imposition of experience rating on capital. 
The intensity rule which reduces benefits based on past participation in the program is 
designed to discourage repeat users from relying on near- decent income replacement during 
unemployment spells. It is intended to do this by a reduction of one percent point in benefit 
rate for every 20 weeks of past claim to a maximum of five percentage points. The tracking of 
claimants past history of repeat users started in July 1, 1996 and it targets all but the full-year-
full-time employees. 
In addition to the intensity rule is the clawback provision which increases the tax back 
of income replacement on workers with incomes above the threshold of $39,000. While 
workers whose income is above $48,750 get their income replacement clawed back at 30% 
rate if they are first time claimants and have collected 2.0 or less weeks of benefits in the last 
five years, the repeat users (i.e. those with more than 20 weeks of benefits in five years) will 
have their benefits clawed back starting at an income of $39,000; the clawback rate ranges 
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from 50% to 100% of their benefits depending on the frequency of their claim in the last five 
years. According to the government's own analysis (HRDC, 1996a), the clawback provision will 
affect 193,000 claimants of which 167,900 (87%) are men and 25,900 (13%) are women. 
The Victims of the Intensity rule 
The current economic condition is such that the scheme will inevitably be characterized 
by repeat participation by a segment of the labour force. Not only the seasonality of certain 
industries but also the persistence of high unemployment rate, the current labour market 
economy characterized by a trimming-down of the labour force both in public and private 
sectors, the large scale temporary as well as permanent lay-offs whether the economy is 
expanding or contracting, the capital-induced intensification of temporary, contract and "just-in-
time" staffing, all imply that workers will be exposed to repeated unemployment spells. The lay-
offs and the down-sizing of the labour force are exacerbated by the rapid technological change 
which is replacing labour power and/or reducing the hours of work and where, as a result, 
capital is employing workers for short spells increasingly. 
These factors cumulatively intensify the incidence of unemployment and the 
subsequent participation in Ul. Late 1970s and 1980s saw as many as 80% percent of Ul 
beneficiaries cycling in and out of the program. Forty percent of these claimants were in their 
fifth or more claims. In 1989, 50% of all claims made by males and 30% by females were 
made by repeat users on their fifth or greater claim. During the same year, over 90% of the 
claims in Newfoundland and Prince Edward Island were made by repeat claimants. 65% of 
these claimants were experiencing their fifth or higher claims. While New Brunswick and Nova 
Scotia had similar figures to that of Newfoundland and Prince Edward Island, the rest of the 
provinces had about 28% to 35% of claimants in their fifth or greater claims in 1989 (all figures 
taken from Corak, 1993, 1996). 
In the years between 1990 and 1995, 40% percent of Ul beneficiaries were seasonal 
workers; and the proportion of repeat-users of these workers as compared to other 
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beneficiaries were higher. Sixty six percent of frequent claims during the first half of the ' 90s 
were made by seasonal workers of whom the majority were men (64%). These claimants were 
in their third claim during this time (Pulkingham , 1998, forthcoming) . Specifically looking at 
1993, we find that nearly one million Ul claimants or 40% of the total beneficiaries were into 
their third or more claims in five years. The Atlantic provinces had a higher proportion of 
repeat users than the rest of the provinces (Wiggins, 1996). 
This workforce will experience a reduction of benefits by three to five percent by the 
imposition of the intensity rule alone. The penalty will reduce income replacement by about 
$400 million in the next three to five years (Wiggins, 1996). Those in the low-wage 
employment will be the hardest hit by this reform measure as most of the unemployment spells 
are experienced by them (Ross and Shellington, 1991 ; Nakamura, 1995). Wiggins (1996) for 
example, shows that more of than 70% of the repeat claimants in the Atlantic provinces earned 
$15,000 or less in 1991 . 
Regions with high unemployment rates also have higher incidence of unemployment 
and thus high participation and/or repeat-use of the program. The intensity rule will , thus, 
disproportionately affect the low-wage, seasonal and temporary workers in regions with high 
rates of unemployment. Its effects also goes beyond these workers in these regions where the 
economic activity revolves around seasonal jobs. Ul benefits in such regions is key to 
maintaining the purchasing power between seasons and in keeping other economic activities 
that depend on the economy of the seasonal jobs to continue (Pulkingham, 1998, forthcoming) . 
Among the most affected are also the visible minorities because they are concentrated in 
the low-paying , temporary and seasonal jobs (Wiggins, 1996; Pulkingham, 1998 forthcoming) . 
Premiums 
Workers who earned less than 20% of the Maximum Insurable Earnings were not 
insured under the old program. Neither did they pay premiums on their earnings. However, the 
weekly minimums and maximums were eliminated with the conversion of entitlement for 
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benefits from weeks-based to hours-based work. Premiums are now levied on every dollar 
earned, up to the Maximum Insurable Earnings of $39,000. Those whose income is less than 
$2000 in a year will receive a refund through the tax system. Over one million and three 
hundred thousand, 700,000 of whom are women (HRDC, 1996a) will contribute to a program 
that does not provide coverage for them. This number does not include those who earn over 
$2000 but work less than the entry requirements. The latter do not receive refunds; nor do they 
collect benefits in the event of unemployment. Many workers in non-standard forms of 
employment fall short of accumulating or banking sufficient hours to meet the variable 
entrance requirements ; and others, as new entrants and re-entrants to the market, lack 910 
hours of workforce attachment to be eligible for benefits. These workers pay premiums but do 
not qualify for benefits. Neither will they be entitled for refund of premiums unless their 
earnings are $2000 or less. Herein lies the contradiction to making the program user- funded 
insurance as some of the workers will not see income replacement at a time of unemployment. 
Small business with fewer than 25 employees and whose overall premium payments 
are less than $ 30,000 are now eligible for premium refunds. 
Maximum Insurable Earning (MIE) 
The Maximum Insurable Earnings which determines the size of income replacement 
has been reduced from its 1995 level of up to $815 of weekly earnings (or up to $42,380 per 
year) to $750 a week, or $39,000 per year in 1996. It will remain frozen at this level till year 
2000 (HRDC, 1996a). One of the government's reason for the reduction of the MIE was in 
response to capital's demand that its cost of production (premiums) be reduced . As the 
government (HRDC, 1996a) indicated, "small business , in particular, have warned that 
continued premium increases are costing jobs" (p.12). The other reason as noted in the same 
publication is " ... to narrow the difference between wages covered by Eland the average wage 
of Canadian workers" (p 5) . The Average industrial wage is estimated at $30,000 per year. 
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The reduction of MIE, therefore, will lower the cost of production for capital while at the 
same time it lowers the income replacement of the insured unemployed. A decrease in MIE 
affects the maximum weekly benefits and the clawback threshold; where as it has been 
$448.25 ($815 x 55%) two years ago, it is now $413 ($750 x 55%). Thus, although the 
replacement rate of 55% is not changed under the new system, the reduction of MIE reduces 
the income replacement levels for higher paid workers. The underlying assumption is that well-
paid workers do not deserve a good portion of their income to be replaced when they 
experience joblessness (Wiggins, 1996). One of the ways of achieving the government's 
overarching objectives of removing barriers to paid employment (HRDC, 1996a), thus, includes 
lowering income replacement of the relatively well-paid employees; as Wiggins (1996) 
observes, this is a clear indication that the government "has bought into low-wage strategy"; 
lowering the MIE, which in turn lowers the replacement income is "using Ul as a tool to 
induce unemployed workers into taking jobs which pay well below the rate of pay of 
their former jobs"(p 78).(emphasis added). 
The reduction in MIE also means lower premium payments for those with relatively higher 
income. However, the lower paid employees (workers earning up to $39,000/year) will pay 
premiums on the first dollar earned to their maximum income of $39,000. This in effect is 
regressive and shifts contributions to Ul from higher -to-lower-income earners. As women earn 
substantially less than men (see Appendix 3) on average, they will shoulder the burden; only 
18% of women workers have incomes over the MIE compared to 39% of men (Wiggins, 1996). 
The implication is that 82 % of women and 61% of men workers will proportionally pay higher 
premiums. 
The collection of premiums on every dollar of the low-income earners, the lowering of 
the insurable earnings and the adjustments in premiums levied from the high-income earners 
as well as the reduction of income replacement of the latter has the effect of making the 
program more of a user-funded insurance program (i. e. premiums are paid on every dollar of 
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the low-income earner and the compensation for the higher paid worker is brought to within 
the maximum of the lower-paid worker) . It has to be noted that lower paid workers are those 
who suffer more unemployment spells than the higher-paid workers and who rely more on the 
program for protection (Ross and Shellington, 1991 ). 
The reduction in MIE will affect maternity, parental and adoption benefits of women and 
men (18% and 39% respectively) whose earnings is above the MIE. Women will be affected by 
this change more as they are the majority (96%) of those who make use of the special 
benefits. The overall reduction in MIE in conjunction with the reduction in premiums (by five 
cents on every insurable $100 for workers and by seven cents for employers for every $1 00 of 
their worker's insurable earnings) will remove $1 .25 billion from the program of which $730 
million is by way of savings to employers (HRDC, 1996a). 
The Family Income Supplement (FIS) 
The Employment Insurance program incorporates income top-up equal to the weekly 
amount of Child Tax Benefit (CTB) for those who qualify for CTB .The FIS targets the poor by 
making the supplement available to a claimant who "establishes (and) meets the prescribed 
low-income family eligibility criteria .. . similar to the criteria for receiving a Child Tax Benefit" (EI 
Act, section 16(1) & (2)). The top-up is for the first time based on total family incomes less 
than $25,921. The FIS replaces the benefit rate of 60% under the old system which was based 
on claimant's individual income. The top-up of 60% under the Ul was introduced with the 
revision of the program which reduced benefit rates of claimants. During this revision in 1993, 
the rate of benefits payable to a claimant for a week of unemployment was reduced from 60% 
of the average weekly insurable earnings to 57%; and a year later, with the introduction of two-
tiered system, the rate was reduced further to 55% of average weekly insurable earnings. With 
the creation of the two-tierd system, claimants who have dependents and whose earnings 
were at or below half the MIE were eligible for 60% rate (Koskie and et al , 1995). The FIS 
which is restricted only to those who qualify for CTB increases with the number of children in 
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the family. The total benefit will be at 65% of average insured earnings and could reach up to 
80% by the year 2000; however, the top-up stops at the maximum weekly benefit rate of $413. 
According to the government (HRDC,1996a), the FIS is expected to offset the reduction 
of benefits that occurs as a result of the fixed averaging period . As it was described in the 
preceding pages, the fixed averaging period and the 'divisor' where claimants are expected to 
have at least two weeks over the entry requirement in order to get the 55% of income 
replacement, and the gaps in earnings jointly conspire to reduce income replacement below 
the maximum replacement of 55%. Low-income earners with dependent children are also 
subjected to these measures whereby their income replacement could fall below the maximum 
weekly benefit rate. 
As mentioned earlier, it was established that low-wage earnings and unemployment 
levels are inversely related : the lower the income level the higher the unemployment rate 
(Ross and Schellington, 1991 ); this implies that the low-wage earners will be over-represented 
among the 'frequent-users' of the program. The government's (HRDC, 1996a) information 
indicates that 54% of low- wage workers with dependents are repeat-users. However, unlike 
their counterparts (low-wage earners without dependent children), they will not be subjected to 
the intensity rule. Table 6 shows that 14% of all claimants will be entitled to the top-up of 
benefits. Over forty-five percent of these workers are lone-parent women and 5.1% are lone-
parent men; 54.3% of the low-income claimants are two-parent families. Women comprise the 
majority (89%) of the lone parent families and 48.7% of the two parent families 
(Pulkingham,1998, forthcoming). In total 234,500 of the 350,000 are women claimants. 
The fact that the FIS is based on total family earnings as opposed to the individual 
claimant's income means that those who were previously eligible for the 60% rate based on 
their individual earnings and those whose family income is in excess of the $25,921 ceiling will 
be disentitled. It is estimated that more than 33% of claimants previously entitled to the 
supplement will now be excluded from the top-up provisions (Pulkingham, 1998). The tying of 
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Table 6 Low-Income Earners Eligible For Family Income Supplement 
Total El Claimants 2,454,000 %of FIS %of lone-
Total eligible parent 
Total FIS Eligible 350,000 
Lone-parent 160,000 45.7% 100% 
Percent of total Women-headed 142,000 40.6% 89% 
Claimants 14% Men-headed 18,000 5.1% 11.25% 
Two-parent 190,000 54.3% N/A 
Source: Compiled from HRDC, 1996a, tables 1 & 2, p. 8 
El benefits with family income is an introduction of income-test into the provision of income 
replacement in the event of unemployment. This is an inroad made towards further erosion of 
the scheme that temporarily cushioned the impact of temporary joblessness. The distinction 
between the non-means-tested entitlement of benefits and the stigmatized and victim-blaming 
income support such as social assistance is now blurred as a result of the introduction of 
family income test for the entitlement of the top-up. 
Conclusion: 
Although Ul was designed not to undermine the workings of the labour market economy 
from the outset, it was still criticized by neo-conservatives as an obstacle to labour market 
"flexibility". Not only is El, therefore, designed to rid the program of its perceived 'hindering 
function' but also to reflect labour market patterns and inequalities between workers. The 
selectivity introduced to the program lie in the following : (1) the emphasis on workforce 
attachment and the distinction between "minor'' (those in non-standard forms of employment 
with less than 700 hours in the qualifying period) and "major'' workforce attachment; (2) the 
penalties for the former and frequent-users; (3) the new/re-entrant requirement of 910 hours; 
and (4) the reduction and/or elimination of benefits for those categorized as workers with minor 
attachment. All these factors cumulatively penalize those in non-standard forms of employment 
for not confirming to the full-time-full-year-work (a work arrangement which is increasingly 
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being redefined by capital) . These workers are blamed , as Pulkingham (1998, forthcoming) 
notes, "for their purported lack of 'work effort', 'individual initiative' and 'insufficient workforce 
attachment". 
Those involved in seasonal work and others cornered into part-time employment are 
portrayed as engaged in these forms of employment by choice rather than by necessity. 
Despite their already proportionally lower benefits due to lower earnings when compared to the 
full-time workers, they are targeted and penalized further in order to instill a greater work-
value. El, for the first time in the history of unemployment insurance, links entitlements 
explicitly with "bad forms of dependence (and) lack of work effort", (Pulkingham, 1998, 
forthcoming), workers with major and minor workforce attachments, the repeat-users and the 
"trapped". The compartmentalization of workers into these categories and "UI cheater stories" 
help to justify the following: the selectivity introduced into the program; the incremental but 
significant erosion of the program; the creation of a fertile soil for low-wage jobs; fast track 
incorporation of the unemployed into capital-wage labour for the few who will land jobs; and 
fast track exit from Ul into highly stigmatized social assistance programs. Entrance into the 
latter program whose means-testing is based on abject needs (and whose provision falls far 
below that of low income cut-off) has a devastating effect on those who previously were 
protected by the jobless security net. 
Kirsh (1992) notes that poverty is related to chronic stress, and this in turn can lead to 
mental and physical illness. Among "the factors that affect the degree to which individuals 
suffer during unemployment", according to the same author, is the "relative amount of 
economic deprivation as a consequence of job loss" (p. 52) . Herein lies the impact of the 
changes introduced in El on the precariously employed. While unemployment insurance was 
intended to protect 'employable' people from the welfare cheques meant for the 
unemployable, the distinction is now blurred as many former workers will have to rely on 
welfare in the event of unemployment. 
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Common sense dictates that with a high unemployment rate and reduced or eliminated 
income replacement, more people will sink into economic hardship and poverty. The tandem 
movement of unemployment and the incidence of poverty shown in Chart 3 points to a direct 
link between the two: the higher the level of unemployment, the higher the incidence of 
poverty. This situation can only be exacerbated by the current change in (Un)Employment 
Insurance which, as shown in the preceding pages, is designed to disentitle some and reduce 
the income replacement and duration of benefits for others. Since about 42% (33% in non-
standard forms of employment and about 9% unemployed) of the labour force are at the 
margins of the labour market, very many of those disentitled or those who exit from the 
scheme fast, as well as those whose income replacement is reduced, will fall into welfare. As 
noted by National Council of Welfare(NCW) (1997) , "Canadians wind up on welfare for a 
number of reasons, but one of the main reasons is unemployment. Welfare statistics dating 
back to the beginning of the Canada Assistance Plan in 1966 show a strong link between the 
number of people on welfare and the number of people unemployed" (p.1). 
Chart 3 
Unemployment Rate and Persons in Low Income: Canada, 1980-1995 
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Many of the disentitled workers and those whose benefit levels and weeks are reduced 
due to the loss of their precarious employment will join ranks of the welfare pool (2.8 million 
Canadians in 1997 as reported by NCW, 1977). This population's income falls well below the 
low income cut-off in every province (see Appendix 2). In 1995, the number of persons with 
incomes below the low income cut-off was 5.2 million (Statistics Canada, 13-207-XPB) and 2.5 
million people had to rely on food banks as a result of inadequate income or low-wage jobs. 
This number can only grow with the weakening of the jobless security net. 
Future Research 
This study focused on changes in key areas of the El Act. It showed how these 
changes restrict access to and/or reduce benefit levels of those in non-standard forms of 
employment in the move from partial unemployment to full-time unemployment. Although the 
reduction of Ul beneficiaries to about 33% of the unemployed, and the resulting surplus in El 
fund of about $16 billion attests to the fact that the jobless security net has lost its catching 
power, the study has not quantified those who will fall onto welfare or those who will be forced 
to take any job anywhere at any wage rate. It is therefore recommended that future research 
examine the impact of the changes in (Un)Employment Insurance on welfare caseload. 
It is also suggested that the employment programs, or as the government (HRDC, 
1996) calls them, 'active re-employment benefits' be subjected to scrutiny in terms of their 
support for the unemployed and how they aid and/or relate to the accumulation process. This 
is important because the government's contentions are that while income replacement 
discourages some workers from seeking employment, the training and retraining, job sharing, 
job subsidy and other related 'active re-employment benefits' will help workers find jobs and 
employers to create employment. 
And finally, as the issue of social insurance is related to (un)employment, it is also 
suggested that the redefinition of standard hours of work be considered for further research . It 
is my view that proposals for increased benefit levels or benefit weeks, or advocacy for easier 
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access to the program is too problematic given that 42% of the labour force in Canada is at the 
margins of the productive labour force. Capital, supported by technology and driven by its 
ideology, has demonstrated that it, and society at large, can maintain production with a 
declining portion of the labour force employed full-time, more than a third (33%) precariously 
employed and a section of the population unemployed. The labour market which is intensifying 
casual , temporary, part-time and 'just-in-time' employment points out that society can afford to 
produce more with fewer hours of work and less labour. This also implies that society can 
redefine the standard hours of work to reintegrate the unemployed into the labour market. 
Technological innovations have enabled capital to produce more with less labour. That 
is, the total economic production now requires less labour. What is lagging behind these 
developments is the use of working time as a measure of income, or as the basis for the 
distribution of social wealth (Gorz, 1994). Gorz (1994) observes that the use of working time as 
a measure of income or the distribution of social production is "clung to solely for reasons of 
ideology and political domination .. . [and] ... untenable work ethics" (p.75). The same author 
reminds us that the technological innovations have made possible the uncoupling of income 
from work time but not income from work. Accordingly, trade unions in Europe in general and 
those in Germany in particular are aiming for and working towards 30 hours a week of work 
without loss of income. 
There is no reason why this should not be considered in Canada. The starting point in 
this endeavour and that suggested for research is the feasibility of banning over-time and 
double dipping by professionals and retirees, shorter work days or weeks, job-sharing and the 
central aspect to work redistribution which is the reduction of standard hours of work without 
loss of income. 
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Popul- Partie- Unem- Emp./ 
tion pation ployment pop. 
Year 15 years+ Part-time Unem- Rate Rate Ratio 
Rate 
% ........... ..:.:..:.: 
1946 8779 4829 53.1 
1947 9007 4942 4832 110 54.9 2.2 53.6 
1948 9141 4988 4875 114 54.6 2.3 53.3 
1949 9268 5055 4913 141 54.5 2.8 53.0 
1950 9615 5163 4976 186 53.7 3.6 51 .8 
1951 9732 5223 5097 126 53.7 2.4 52.4 
1952 9956 5324 5169 155 53.5 2.9 51 .9 
1953 10164 5397 5235 162 53.1 3.0 51 .5 
1954 10391 5493 5243 250 52.9 4.6 50.5 
1955 10597 5610 5364 245 52.9 4.4 50.6 
1956 10807 5782 5585 197 53.5 3.4 51.7 
1957 11123 6008 5731 278 54.0 4.6 51 .5 
1958 11388 6137 5706 432 53.9 7.0 50.1 
1959 11605 6242 5870 372 53.8 6.0 50.6 
1960 11831 6411 5965 446 54.1 7.0 50.4 
1961 12053 6521 6055 466 54.4 7.1 50.2 
1962 12280 6615 6225 390 57.3 5.9 50.7 
1963 12536 6748 6375 374 57.6 5.5 50.9 
1964 12817 6933 6609 324 57.6 4.7 51 .6 
1965 13128 7141 6862 280 57.9 3.9 52.3 
1966 13083 7493 7242 251 57.8 3.4 55.4 
1967 13444 7747 7451 296 58.1 3.8 55.4 
1968 13805 7951 7593 358 58.6 4.5 55.0 
1969 14162 8194 7832 362 59.7 4.4 55.3 
1970 14528 8395 7919 476 60.5 5.7 54.5 
1971 14872 8639 8104 535 61 .1 6.2 54.5 
1972 15186 8897 8344 553 61 .5 6.2 54.9 
1973 15526 9276 8761 515 62.1 5.5 56.4 
1974 15924 9639 9125 514 63.1 5.3 57.3 
1975 16323 9974 9284 690 64.0 6.9 56.9 
1976 17124 10530 9776 754 64.6 7.2 57.1 
1977 17493 10860 9978 8,677.3 1300.9 13.0 882 65.3 8.1 57.0 
1978 17839 11265 10320 8947.7 1372.7 13.3 945 64.7 8.4 57.9 
1979 18183 11630 10761 9247.8 1485.9 13.8 870 64.9 7.5 59.2 
1980 18550 11983 11082 9491 .8 1590.7 14.4 900 65.3 7.5 59 .7 
1981 18883 12332 11398 9699.9 1698.2 14.9 934 65.8 7.6 60.4 
1982 19177 12398 11035 9276.3 1758.8 15.9 1363 66.3 11.0 57.5 
1983 19433 12610 11106 9242.2 1863.5 16.8 1504 66.7 11 .9 57.1 
1984 19681 12853 11402 9490.7 1911 .8 16.8 1450 67.2 11 .3 57 .9 
1985 19929 13123 11742 9745.3 1996.7 17.0 1381 67.5 10.5 58.9 
1986 20182 13378 12095 10045.1 2049.4 16.9 1283 67.3 9.6 59.9 
1987 20432 13631 12422 10354.3 2068.2 16.6 1208 66.7 8.9 60.8 
1988 20690 13900 12819 10666.9 2152.0 16.8 1082 67.2 7.8 62.0 
1989 20968 14151 13086 i:?!d@.iiiltM:::::??:::::::::gt®.iW~:~~:::t:~:~~~~::m:tm~t:m:::m: 1065 67.5 7.5 62.4 
1990 21277 14329 13165 10929 2236.2 17.0 1164 67.3 8.1 61 .9 
1991 21613 14408 12916 10573.6 2342.5 18.1 1492 66.7 10.4 59.8 
1992 21986 14482 12842 ::::~:~A:iw@:::~::::::::::::::::::oo.t11~::::::::}::::::::::::J:~;§:m::::::::: 1640 65.9 11 .3 58.4 
1993 22371 14663 13015 10534.4 2480.3 19.1 1649 65.5 11 .2 58.2 
1994 22717 14832 13292 10798.4 2493.3 18.8 1541 65.3 10.4 58.5 
1995 23027 14928 13506 10996.8 2508.8 18.6 1422 64.8 9.5 58.6 
1996 15145.4 13676.2 11087.2 2589.0 18.9 .. 
I Canada, Winter 1996 Perspectives, Cat# 75-001-XPE 
Labour Force Survey, 1996 
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